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In this Article Professor Post argues that the common law tort of inva-
sion of privacy safeguards social norms, which he calls "rules of civility,"
that in significant measure constitute both individual and community
identity. The tort is predicated upon the assumption that personality, as
well as human dignity, are injured by the violation of these norms. Civility
rules also create a "ritual idiom" that allows individuals to recognize and
differentiate between respect and intimacy; fluency in this idiom enables
individuals to become autonomous persons. In protecting civility rules,
however, the law must transform social norms into workable legal doctrine,
and it must determine the nature of the community whose norms it will
preserve. Civility rules that control the dissemination of information con-
flict with the prerequisites of the 'public," which is a social formation cre-
ated when persons, otherwise unrelated, are united by access to common
social stimuli. Within the "public," communication is driven by a logic of
accountability that is largely indifferent to norms of civility. The values of
privacy, and the identity ofpersons and communities predicated upon those
values, are thus endangered by the vast contemporary expansion of the
public created by the mass media.
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INTRODUCTION
Privacy is commonly understood as a value asserted by individuals
against the demands of a curious and intrusive society.' Thus it is
remarked that "[p]rivacy rests upon an individualist concept of society," 2
and that one of "the main enemies of privacy in our own time" is "Com-
munity."3 Consistent with this understanding, the function of the com-
mon law tort of invasion of privacy is usually said to be protecting the
"subjective" interests of individuals against "injury to the inner person."4
The stated purpose of the tort is to provide redress for "injury to [a]
plaintiff's emotions and his mental suffering." 5
The origins of the tort of invasion of privacy lie in a famous article
on The Right to Privacy published in 1890 by Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis.6 Arguing powerfully for legal recognition of "the right to pri-
vacy, as a part of the more general right to the immunity of the person,-
the right to one's personality,"7 the article sparked the development of
the modem tort,8 which has now evolved into four distinct branches:
unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another,9 unreasonable pub-
licity given to another's private life,1 ° appropriation of another's name or
likeness,II and publicity that unreasonably places another in a false light
1. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 549 (1970). For an excellent
discussion and critique of this understanding, see Boone, Privacy and Community, 9 Soc. THEORY &
PRAC. 1, 1-3, 14-21 (1983).
2. R. HIXSON, PRIVACY IN A PUBLIC SOCIETY: HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONFLICT at xv (1987);
see also A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 27 (1967); Andre, Privacy as an Aspect of the First
Amendment: The Place of Privacy in a Society Dedicated to Individual Liberty, 20 U. WEST L.A. L.
REV. 87, 89 (1988-89).
3. B. MOORE, PRIVACY: STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY 267 (1984). Or,
conversely, it is said that "[p]rivacy means alienation" and hence impedes the attainment of
"authentic community." Freeman & Mensch, The Public-Private Distinction in American Law and
Life, 36 BUFFALO L. REV. 237, 238-39 (1987).
4. Emerson, The Right of Privacy and Freedom of the Press, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 329,
333 (1979).
5. Froelich v. Adair, 213 Kan. 357, 360, 516 P.2d 993, 997 (1973); see also Hazlitt v. Fawcett
Publications, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 538, 544 (D. Conn. 1953).
6. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). The article "is
perhaps the most famous and certainly the most influential law review article ever written."
Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 203 (1954). For a discussion of
the historical circumstances surrounding the Warren and Brandeis article, see D. PEMBER, PRIVACY
AND THE PRESS: THE LAW, THE MASS MEDIA, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 20-57 (1972).
7. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 6, at 207.
8. The tort is today recognized in one form or another in almost every jurisdiction in the
nation. For a state-by-state overview, see LIBEL DEFENSE RESOURCE CENTER, 50-STATE SURVEY
1988: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MEDIA LIBEL AND INVASION OF PRIVACY LAW 924-67
(1988). The tort is still not recognized by English courts. J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 572
(7th ed. 1987); see also W. PRATT, PRIVACY IN BRITAIN 16-17 (1979).
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
10. Id. § 652D.
11. Id. §652C.
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before the public.12 In this essay I shall analyze the first two of these
branches, 3 and attempt to demonstrate that the tort does not simply
uphold the interests of individuals against the demands of community,
but instead safeguards rules of civility that in some significant measure
constitute both individuals and community. The tort rests not upon a
perceived opposition between persons and social life, but rather upon
their interdependence. Paradoxically, that very interdependence makes
possible a certain kind of human dignity and autonomy which can exist
only within the embrace of community norms.
Interpreted in this way, the common law tort of invasion of privacy
offers a rich and complex apprehension of the texture of social life in
America. That apprehension is sensitive not merely to the prerogatives
of social norms in defining persons and communities, but also to the limi-
tations of those prerogatives when faced with competing demands from,
for example, the requirements of public governance and accountability.
I
THE TORT OF INTRUSION: PRIVACY, CIVILITY,
AND THE SELF
The conceptual structure that underlies the branch of the tort which
regulates unreasonable intrusion can be illuminated by consideration of
an elementary case, Hamberger v. Eastman. ' 4 Eastman was decided by
the New Hampshire Supreme Court in 1964, and constituted the state's
first official recognition of the tort of invasion of privacy. I choose the
case because it is so entirely unexceptional and representative in its rea-
soning and conclusions. The plaintiffs were a husband and wife who
alleged that the defendant, their landlord and neighbor, had installed an
eavesdropping device in their bedroom. The New Hampshire Supreme
Court, adopting William Prosser's novel proposal that the tort of inva-
sion of privacy be divided into four distinct branches,' 5 characterized the
plaintiffs' complaint as "the tort of intrusion upon the plaintiffs' solitude
or seclusion."' 6
The plaintiffs alleged that as a result of the discovery of the eaves-
dropping device they were "greatly distressed, humiliated, and embar-
rassed," that they sustained "intense and severe mental suffering and
12. Id. § 652E.
13. I defer analysis of the "false light" branch because of its close affiliation with the tort of
defamation; I similarly defer analysis of the appropriation branch because of its subtle and complex
relationship with concepts of property rights in personal image.
14. 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964).
15. See Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960); compare id. with RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS § 867 (1939).
16. Eastman, 106 N.H. at 110, 206 A.2d at 241.
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distress, and ha[d] been rendered extremely nervous and upset.' 7 The
New Hampshire Supreme Court had little difficulty in finding that, "by
way of understatement," the type of intrusion suffered by the plaintiffs
"would be offensive to any person of ordinary sensibilities.""8 It did not
matter, said the court, that the plaintiffs could not establish that anyone
ever "listened or overheard any sounds or voices originating from the
plaintiffs' bedroom,"1 9 since the gravamen of the plaintiffs' cause of
action rested solely on the intrusive installation of the offensive device.
At first glance Eastman tells a rather simple story. "Marital bed-
rooms," as the United States Supreme Court has had occasion to observe
in the first of its modem constitutional right to privacy cases, are "sacred
precincts,"20 in which we expect privacy and into which it is plainly
highly offensive to intrude.2" An invasion of privacy is "an injury to
personality. It impairs the mental peace and comfort of the individual
and may produce suffering more acute than that produced by a mere
bodily injury."22 The plaintiffs in Eastman experienced just such
"mental suffering," and the function of the tort is to provide redress for
that injury. 23
In all probability this story accurately reflects how the vast majority
of judges and lawyers understand the tort of invasion of privacy. It is a
story, however, that places an intense and narrow focus on the actual
mental suffering of specific individuals. The limitations of this focus
become apparent once it is understood that the eavesdropping device in
Eastman was not defined as an invasion of privacy merely because the
plaintiffs were in fact discomforted, but rather because the installation of
the device was "offensive to any person of ordinary sensibilities."24 In
the later language of the second Restatement of Torts, the placement of
the eavesdropping device was actionable because it "would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person."25
17. Id. at 109, 206 A.2d at 240.
18. Id. at 111, 206 A.2d at 242.
19. Id. at 112, 206 A.2d at 242.
20. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
21. For an historical account of the origins of these expectations, see W. RYnCZYNSKI, HOME:
A SHORT HISTORY OF AN IDEA 15-49 (1986).
22. Eastman, 106 N.H. at 112, 206 A.2d at 242 (quoting 3 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 58
(1959)); see also Emerson, supra note 4, at 333; Wade, The Communicative Torts and the First
Amendment, 47 Miss. L.J. 671, 707-08 (1977).
23. "The action sounds in tort and when authorized is primarily to recover for a hurt to the
feelings of the individual." Wheeler v. P. Sorensen Mfg. Co., 415 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Ky. 1967); see
also Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-Am., Inc., 188 Conn. 107, 128 n.19, 448 A.2d 1317, 1329
n.19 (1982); Froelich v. Adair, 213 Kan. 357, 362, 516 P.2d 993, 998 (1973); Billings v. Atkinson,
489 S.W.2d 858, 861 (Tex. 1973); Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70, 87 (W. Va.
1984).
24. Eastman, 106 N.H. at 111, 206 A.2d at 242.
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). The Restatement provides that "[olne
[Vol. 77:957
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The "reasonable person" is of course a figure who continually reap-
pears in American common law, most especially in the law of torts. The
important point about the reasonable person is that he is no one in partic-
ular; "[h]e is not to be identified with any real person."26 He is rather, as
a standard text would have it, "an abstraction," a representative of "the
normal standard of community behavior," who embodies "the general
level of moral judgment of the community, what it feels ought ordinarily
to be done."27 Thus in Eastman the installation of the eavesdropping
device is transformed into an actionable invasion of privacy because the
general level of moral judgment in the community finds it highly offen-
sive for landlords and neighbors to spy on marital bedrooms. The East-
man court states that "[ilt is only where [an] intrusion has gone beyond
the limits of decency that liability accrues."28 The tort of invasion of
privacy, we may thus conclude, is at least as concerned with policing
these "limits of decency" as with redressing the mental distress of partic-
ular plaintiffs.
The Restatement characterizes these limits as those whose transgres-
sion would be "highly offensive." At first blush this notion of "offense"
appears to describe the actual mental distress alleged to have been suf-
fered by the Eastman plaintiffs. Webster's Third New International Dic-
tionary, for example, defines "offensive" as that which gives "painful or
unpleasant sensations" or causes "displeasure or resentment."29 But the
"displeasure" or "painful sensations" at issue in the Eastman case cannot
be those of the plaintiffs, for their particular mental condition is not
determinative of whether the installation of the eavesdropping device is
an actionable invasion of privacy. So it must be the "reasonable person"
who suffers. But that leaves us with something of an enigma, for the
reasonable person is only a generic construct without real emotions.
For this reason, the pain or displeasure at issue cannot be under-
stood as actual sensations or emotions. Because the reasonable person is
not simply an empirical or statistical "average" of what most people in
the community believe, the mental distress at issue also cannot be under-
stood as a mere empirical or statistical prediction about what the major-
ity of persons in a community would be likely to experience. Instead,
because the reasonable person is a genuine instantiation of community
norms, the concept of offensiveness at issue in Eastman must be under-
stood as predicated upon a quality that inheres in such norms.
who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his
private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the
intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person." Id.
26. Id. § 283 comment c.
27. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 16.2 (1956).
28. Eastman, 106 N.H. at 111, 206 A.2d at 242.
29. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1556 (unabr. 1986).
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The dictionary suggests the nature of that quality when it states that
the adjective 'offensive' "describes what is disagreeable or nauseating or
painful because of outrage to taste and sensibilities or affronting insult-
ingness."3° The pain or displeasure associated with the offensive can be
understood as flowing from this "outrage" or "affront." Outrage or
affront, however, are ways of describing how it is appropriate to feel
when certain social norms have been transgressed. Hence when the law
asks whether the reasonable person would find certain invasions of pri-
vacy "highly offensive," it is not seeking merely to predict actual emo-
tions, but rather to characterize those social norms whose violation
would appropriately cause affront or outrage.
Thus a more precise characterization of the conceptual structure
underlying Eastman is that a plaintiff is entitled to relief if it can be
demonstrated that a defendant has transgressed the kind of social norms
whose violation would properly be viewed with outrage or affront, and
that the function of this relief is to redress "injury to personality." This
legal structure typifies the tort of intrusion. It rests on the premise that
the integrity of individual personality is dependent upon the observance
of certain kinds of social norms.
This premise, of course, also underlies much of sociological thought.
For purposes of analyzing the privacy tort, the most systematic and help-
ful explication of the premise may be found in the work of Erving
Goffman. He most explicitly states the premise in his early article on
The Nature of Deference and Demeanor, where he offers an image of
social interactions as founded on rules of "deference and demeanor. '31
Rules of deference define conduct by which a person conveys apprecia-
tion "to a recipient or of this recipient, or of something of which this
recipient is taken as a symbol, extension, or agent."' 32 Rules of demeanor
define conduct by which a person expresses "to those in his immediate
presence that he is a person of certain desirable or undesirable
qualities." '33
Taken together, rules of deference and demeanor constitute "rules of
conduct which bind the actor and the recipient together" and "are the
bindings of society.",34 By following these rules, individuals not only
confirm the social order in which they live, but they also establish and
affirm "ritual" and "sacred" aspects of their own and others' identities.35
Thus Goffman states that each "individual must rely on others to com-
30. Id.
31. E. GOFFMAN, The Nature of Deference and Demeanor, in INTERACTION RITUAL: ESSAYS
ON FACE-To-FACE BEHAVIOR 47, 47 (1967).
32. Id. at 56 (emphasis in original).
33. Id. at 77.
34. Id. at 90.
35. Id. at 91.
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plete the picture of him of which he himself is allowed to paint only
certain parts":
Each individual is responsible for the demeanor image of himself and the
deference image of others, so that for a complete man to be expressed,
individuals must hold hands in a chain of ceremony, each giving deferen-
tially with proper demeanor to the one on the right what will be received
deferentially from the one on the left. While it may be true that the
individual has a unique self all his own, evidence of this possession is
thoroughly a product of joint ceremonial labor, the part expressed
through the individual's demeanor being no more significant than the
part conveyed by others through their deferential behavior toward him.3 6
According to Goffman, then, we must understand individual per-
sonality as constituted in significant aspects by the observance of rules of
deference and demeanor; or, to return to the more prosaic language of
Eastman, by the rules of decency recognized by the reasonable man.37
Violation of these rules can thus damage a person by discrediting his
identity and injuring his personality. Breaking "the chain of ceremony"
can deny an individual the capacity to become "a complete man" and
hence "disconfirm" his very "self.", 38
It is for this reason that the law regards the privacy tort as simulta-
neously upholding social norms and redressing "injury to personality."
We must be clear, however, that in any particular case individuals may
or may not have internalized pertinent rules of deference and demeanor,
and hence may or may not suffer actual injury to personality. But the
device of the reasonable person focuses the law not on actual injury to
the personality of specific individuals, but rather on the protection of that
personality which would be constituted by full observance of the relevant
rules of deference and demeanor, those whose violation would appropri-
ately cause outrage or affront. I shall call such rules "civility rules," and
I shall call the personality that would be upheld by these civility rules
"social personality."
The concept of social personality points simultaneously in two dis-
tinct directibns. On the one hand, the actual personalities of well-social-
ized individuals should substantially conform to social personality, for
such individuals have internalized the civility rules by which social per-
sonality is defined. It is for this reason that the tort of intrusion, even
though formally defined in terms of the expectations of the "reasonable
person," can in practice be expected to offer protection to the emotional
36. Id. at 84-85.
37. George Herbert Mead similarly argues that "[w]hat goes to make up the organized self is
the organization of the attitudes which are common to the group. A person is a personality because
he belongs to a community, because he takes over the institutions of that community into his own
conduct." G.H. MEAD, MIND, SELF AND SOCIETY 162 (1934).
38. E. GOFFMAN, supra note 31, at 51.
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well-being of real plaintiffs. But, on the other hand, social personality
also subsists in a set of civility rules that, when taken together, give nor-
mative shape and substance to the society that shares them. In fact these
rules can be said to define the very "community" which the "reasonable
person" inhabits. They constitute the "special claims which members [of
a community] have on each other, as distinct from others,"3 9 and hence
which create for a community "its distinctive shape, its unique iden-
tity."'' 4 Thus even if particular plaintiffs are not well-socialized and
hence have not suffered actual injury because of a defendant's violation of
civility rules, the law nevertheless endows such plaintiffs with the capac-
ity to bring suit, thereby upholding the normative identity of the commu-
nity inherent in the concept of social personality.
This interpretation of the tort explains what would otherwise be a
puzzling aspect of its legal structure. Most torts require, as distinct ele-
ments of a prima facie case, allegation and proof that the violation of a
relevant social norm has actually caused some form of harm or damage.
For example, if you drive your car carelessly and have an accident, a
lawsuit against you for negligence can succeed only if it establishes that
your negligent behavior has actually caused some demonstrable injury.4
The basic idea is "no harm, no foul." But the tort of invasion of privacy
is qualitatively different because the injury at issue is logically entailed
by, rather than merely contingently caused by, the improper conduct.
An intrusion on privacy is intrinsically harmful because it is defined as
that which injures social personality.
The profile of the invasion of privacy tort reflects this logical struc-
ture. In contrast to the usual cause of action for negligence, the privacy
tort enables a plaintiff to make out his case without alleging or proving
any actual or contingent injury, such as emotional suffering or embar-
rassment. The privacy tort shares this profile with other torts which
redress "dignitary harms."42 In the area of defamation, for example,
where the law also seeks to uphold civility rules,43 a plaintiff could at
common law successfully prosecute a suit, and even receive substantial
39. J. GUSFIELD, COMMUNITY: A CRITICAL RESPONSE 29 (1975).
40. K. ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 11
(1966).
41. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328A (1977).
42. The phrase comes from Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?,
31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 341 (1966). Torts that redress dignitary harms share this
structure with the larger category of "traditional intentional torts." See Givelber, The Right to
Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness Infliction of Emotional Distress by
Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 42, 49-50 (1982). For a roughly analogous distinction
between "damage" torts and "interference" torts, see F.H. LAWSON, "Das subjektive Recht" in the
English Law of Torts, in 1 MANY LAWS: SELECTED ESSAYS 176-92 (1977).
43. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74
CALIF. L. REV. 691, 707-19 (1986).
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sums in "general damages," despite a defendant's credible proof that the
plaintiff had suffered no actual or contingent injury whatever.' In their
1890 article, Warren and Brandeis conceived of the "remedies for an
invasion of the right of privacy" as analogous to "those administered in
the law of defamation." 45 In 1939 the first Restatement of Torts stated
flatly that damages in a privacy action "can be awarded in the same way
in which general damages are given for defamation."46 In its second edi-
tion the Restatement was somewhat more circumspect, 47 stating:
One who has established a cause of action for invasion of his privacy is
entitled to recover damages for
(a) the harm to his interest in privacy resulting from the invasion;
(b) his mental distress proved to have been suffered if it is of a kind
that normally results from such an invasion; and
(c) special damage of which the invasion is a legal cause.48
The Restatement thus enables a plaintiff to maintain a suit, and even
to receive damages, because of harm to an "interest in privacy," notwith-
standing the absence of allegations or proof of actual injury, such as
mental distress. This in effect renders the invasion of privacy tort theo-
retically independent of any merely empirical or contingent consequences
of the violation of the underlying civility rule.4 9 The most plausible
interpretation of this legal structure is that the Restatement has empow-
ered plaintiffs to use the tort to uphold the interests of social personality,
which are necessarily impaired by a defendant's breach of a civility rule.
The strength of this conclusion, however, should be qualified some-
what because of the paucity of reported decisions on point. I have been
able to locate only a very few decisions where plaintiffs have been unable
or unwilling to present any evidence of actual injury. But in those few
cases courts have followed the implications of the Restatement's analysis
44. See id. at 697-98. In 1974 in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348-50 (1974), the
United States Supreme Court held that the first amendment sharply limits awards of such general
damages, although in a recent decision the Court has somewhat loosened these constitutional
restrictions. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 753-61 (1985).
45. Warrefi & Brandeis, supra note 6, at 219.
46. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 comment d (1939).
47. The circumspection was no doubt due to the Supreme Court's recent constitutional
decision in Gertz discussed at supra note 44; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652H
comment c (1977). (Query, however, the impact of the Court's subsequent decision in Dun &
Bradstreet.) Because the tort of intrusion does not involve speech, it is not subject to the kind of first
amendment limitations imposed by Gertz.
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §652H (1977).
49. Thus in the tort of intrusion the Restatement provides that a plaintiff can recover damages
for the violation of his "interest in privacy," which means "the deprivation of his seclusion." Id.
§ 652H comment a.
1989]
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and awarded damages,50 even if only nominal.5 "
The minuscule number of such decisions is itself instructive, how-
ever, for it indicates that as a practical matter virtually every plaintiff will
allege and be able to produce some credible evidence of contingent and
actual injury in the form of emotional suffering. The very credibility of
this evidence suggests how dependent our personalities in fact are upon
the observance of civility rules, and hence confirms the close congruence
between social personality and the actual individual personalities of those
who use the legal system. The strength of this congruence is illustrated
by the confidence with which we instinctively feel the plausibility of the
emotional suffering alleged by plaintiffs in the Eastman case, even though
we have absolutely no empirical knowledge of who those plaintiffs really
are. This confidence can be grounded only on the almost irresistible
assumption that the personalities of those plaintiffs have been forged by
the same rules of civility as have shaped our own personalities.
The privacy tort thus represents a complex pattern in which legal
interventions supportive of general rules of civility occur at the behest of
specific aggrieved individuals. This pattern can be viewed as an attempt
to disperse enforcement authority. In contrast to the criminal law, in
which all power to prosecute infractions of important legal norms is con-
centrated in the hands of accountable public officials, the privacy tort
devolves the authority of enforcement into the hands of private litigants.
But concomitant with this decentralization-or perhaps because of it-
the privacy tort is also concerned with the specific interests of those
plaintiffs who take the trouble to bring violators of civility rules before
adjudicative tribunals. This concern is particularly visible in how the
tort is structured to redress the claims of those who have suffered action-
able injuries.
We may roughly distinguish between two kinds of plaintiff interests.
The first arises because of contingent psychological injuries that plaintiffs
may suffer as a result of the violation of civility rules. Mental anguish
and humiliation are examples of such injuries that are common and rou-
tine. But so are more exotic forms of damage. In Eastman, for example,
the husband alleged that the discovery of the eavesdropping device in his
bedroom had rendered him impotent; his wife alleged that she had been
50. See, eg., Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, 642 F. Supp. 1357, 1417-23
(S.D.N.Y. 1986).
51. See, e.g., Manville v. Borg-Warner Corp., 418 F.2d 434, 437 (10th Cir. 1969); Cason v.
Baskin, 159 Fla. 31, 41, 30 So. 2d 635, 640 (1947); S. HOFSTADTER & G. HOROWiTz, THE RIGHT
OF PRIVACY 265-68 (1964). But see Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 774-75, 299 S.W. 967, 971-72
(1927); Hazlitt v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 538, 544 (D. Conn. 1953). In negligence
actions, by way of contrast, awards of nominal damages are not permitted, because a plaintiff can
succeed only if he demonstrates actual injury. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 907 comment
a (1977).
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made frigid. Although these injuries are idiosyncratic, they nevertheless
deserve redress, and the tort is structured to provide that redress.
52
The second kind of interest arises from the dignitary harm which
plaintiffs suffer as a result of having been treated disrespectfully. Viola-
tions of civility rules are intrinsically demeaning, even if not experienced
as such by a particular plaintiff.53 This is because dignitary harm does
not depend on the psychological condition of an individual plaintiff, but
rather on the forms of respect that a plaintiff is entitled to receive from
others.5" We need to ask how the law can provide redress for the digni-
tary harm which results when these forms of respect are, in important
ways, violated.
The answer can perhaps be found in those not infrequent cases
where juries use the pretext of "psychic and emotional harm" to return
"large verdicts, although little objective evidence is available" ' 5 to sup-
port them. 6 The Restatement shrewdly characterizes such damages as
"vindicating" a plaintiff:
[F]or certain types of dignitary torts, the law serves the purpose of vindi-
cating the injured party. Thus, in suits for defamation [or] invasion of
privacy ... the major purpose of the suit may be to obtain a public
declaration that the plaintiff is right and was improperly treated. This is
more than a simple determination of legal rights for which nominal dam-
ages may be sufficient, and will normally require compensatory or puni-
tive damages.57
The Restatement's conclusion that large damage awards which are
52. There is, however, a limit to the idiosyncracies that the law will recognize. The
Restatement notes, for example, that a plaintiff may "recover damages for emotional distress or
personal humiliation that he proves to have been actually suffered by him, if it is of a kind that
normally results from such an invasion and it is normal and reasonable in its extenL " RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652H comment b (1977) (emphasis added). Apparently the law will not
tolerate too great a divergence between social and individual personality.
53. The formulation of this point is a bit tricky, because often the question of whether a civility
rule has been violated depends upon the subjective attitude of a plaintiff. For example, if the
eavesdropping device in Eastman had been placed with the consent of the plaintiffs, we would not
understand the defendant as having transgressed a civility rule, but rather as having entered into
some mutual, erotic relationship with the plaintiffs. The point in the text, however, is that if the
placement of the device has broken a civility rule-if, for example, the plaintiffs in Eastman had been
unaware of its installation-then the plaintiffs would have been demeaned regardless of their
subjective apprehension.
54. Cf Feinberg, The Nature and Value of Rights, 4 J. VALUE INQUIRY 243, 252 (1970):
[R]espect for persons... may simply be respect for their rights, so that there cannot be the
one without the other; and what is called 'human dignity' may simply be the recognizable
capacity to assert claims. To respect a person, then, or to think of him as possessed of
human dignity, simply is to think of him as a potential maker of claims.
55. Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d 580, 594 (D.C. 1985).
56. On the issue of "excessive" damage awards, see, for example, LIBEL DEF. RESOURCE
BULL., No. 11, Summer-Fall 1984, at 12-18; Socking It to the Press, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Apr. 7,
1984, at 31.
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 comment c (1977).
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seemingly unrelated to any contingent harm represent a form of vindica-
tion is an informed and convincing interpretation.58 To say that the
plaintiff in an invasion of privacy suit requires vindication, however, is to
imply that he is somehow in need of exoneration. But this implication is
puzzling, for the plaintiff has been the victim, not the perpetrator, of a
transgression. The shame of the victim, however, is made explicable by
the fact that he has been denied respect, and consequently his status as a
person to whom respect is due has been called into question.
The victim of the breach of a civility rule, in other words, suffers a
special kind of injury: He is "threatened" with being "discredited"5 9
because he has been excluded from the "chain of ceremony" which estab-
lishes the respect normally accorded to full-fledged members of the com-
munity. Since the boundaries of a community are marked by the
"special claims which members have on each other, as distinct from
others,"6 the defendant's disregard of the plaintiff's claim to be treated
with respect potentially places the plaintiff outside of the bounds of the
shared community. The plaintiff can accordingly be vindicated only by
being reaffirmed as a member of the community. It is plausible to inter-
pret the seemingly excessive damages that sometimes characterize inva-
sion of privacy actions as such an affirmation, which occurs through the
simultaneous enrichment of the plaintiff and the punishment of the
defendant.6" The privacy tort, in other words, functions not merely to
uphold the chain of ceremony, but also, in appropriate cases, to reforge it
when it has been fractured.
II
PRIVACY AND CIVILITY: SOME THEORETICAL
IMPLICATIONS
We have come a long way, then, from the first simple story we were
able to tell about the Eastman case. The underlying structure of the pri-
vacy tort is as much oriented toward safeguarding rules of civility and
the chain of ceremony they establish, as it is toward protecting the emo-
tional well-being of individuals. This understanding of the tort has sev-
eral important theoretical implications, both for the concept of privacy
and for the functioning of the law.
58. In the area of defamation, for example, the punishment of a defendant through the
exaction of high civil damages can be interpreted as the law's attempt to "vindicate" a plaintiff's
honor. See Post, supra note 43, at 703-06.
59. E. GOFFMAN, supra note 31, at 51.
60. J. GLISFIELD, supra note 39, at 29.
61. On the relationship between punishment and vindication, see Post, supra note 43, at 704-
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A. The Normative Nature of Privacy: The Reconciliation of
Community and Autonomy
Consider first the concept of privacy that underlies the tort. It is
obviously quite different from the "neutral concept of privacy"'62 which
some commentators have proposed, and which attempts to define privacy
in purely descriptive and value-free terms. Ruth Gavison, for example,
has defined privacy as a gradient that varies in three dimensions: secrecy,
anonymity, and solitude. She believes that an individual's loss of privacy
can be objectively measured "as others obtain information" about him,
"pay attention to him, or gain access to him."63 The presence or absence
of privacy is thus a fact capable of ascertainment without regard to nor-
mative social conventions.
A "neutral" concept of privacy has certain obvious advantages and
uses. It is useful, for example, in the cross-cultural analysis of privacy,
because it creates an object of analysis that is independent of the various
perceptions of the cultures at issue. It is also useful for efforts to create a
functional account of privacy. The hypothesis that "privacy" is neces-
sary to cause certain consequences will be cleaner and more easily verifi-
able if the "privacy" at issue is conceived as a measurable fact. Thus
Robert Merton rests his claim that privacy "is an important functional
requirement for the effective operation of social structure" on the neutral
definition of privacy as "insulation from observability." 6 Privacy is nec-
essary, argues Merton, because without it "the pressure to live up to the
details of all (and often conflicting) social norms would become literally
unbearable; in a complex society, schizophrenic behavior would become
the rule rather than the formidable exception it already is."65
Whatever the virtue of such neutral definitions of privacy, they are
most certainly not at the foundation of the common law, which rests
instead upon a concept of privacy that is inherently normative. The pri-
vacy protected by the common law tort cannot be reduced to objective
facts like spatial distance or information or observability; it can only be
understood by reference to norms of behavior. A defendant who stands
very close to a plaintiff in a crowded elevator will not be perceived to
have committed a highly offensive intrusion; but the case will be very
different if the defendant stands the same distance away from a plaintiff
in an open field. In the common law, as in everyday life, issues of privacy
refer to the characterization of human action, not to the neutral and
objective measurement of the world.
Thus the sphere of privacy protected by the tort can only be per-
62. Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 425-40 (1980).
63. Id. at 428.
64. R. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 429 (1968).
65. Id.
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ceived through the exercise of what Simmel calls "moral tact."'66
Gavison argues that privacy defined in terms of social norms "is simply a
conclusion, not a tool to analyze whether a certain invasion should be
considered wrong in the first place."' 67 But in the end this objection sim-
ply highlights that the common law attempts not to search out and artic-
ulate first ethical principles, as would a certain kind of moral
philosopher, but instead to discover and refresh the social norms by
which we live, the very norms that to Gavison provide only the starting
point for respectable critique.
Civility rules of course protect dignitary interests other than those of
privacy. But because the common law has not attempted to define "pri-
vacy" in the neutral manner advocated by Gavison, it has on the whole
been almost indifferent to any systematic effort to distinguish between
those civility rules which protect privacy and those which safeguard
other dignitary interests. For this reason the single act of a defendant
will often be the basis for a lawsuit alleging various kinds of dignitary
harms, ranging from invasion of privacy, to defamation, and to the inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. 68
The common law attempts to distinguish privacy from other forms
of social respect primarily through the specification of the formal ele-
ments of the privacy tort. The formal elements of the branch of privacy
law known as "intrusion," the precise privacy law tort at issue in
Eastman, require a plaintiff to allege that a defendant has intentionally
intruded upon the plaintiff's solitude or seclusion in a manner that would
be highly offensive to a reasonable person.69 The formal elements of the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, on the other hand,
require a plaintiff to allege that a defendant has, by means of extreme and
outrageous conduct, intentionally caused the plaintiff severe emotional
distress.70
Obviously these elements overlap substantially, and it is not surpris-
ing that plaintiffs will frequently allege both intrusion and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.71 But the elements of the two torts are
66. G. SIMMEL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL 324 (K. Wolff trans. & ed. 1950).
67. Gavison, supra note 62, at 426 n.18.
68. For a recent and notorious example in which all three torts were alleged, see Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876, 878 (1988). For a more typical case, see Sawabini v. Desenberg,
143 Mich. App. 373, 372 N.W.2d 559 (Ct. App. 1985). For a statistical study of pleading practices
with respect to dignitary torts, see Mead, Suing Media for Emotional Distress: A Multi-Method
Analysis of Tort Law Evolution, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 24, 36-44 (1983).
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977), quoted at supra note 25.
70. Id. § 46. Although the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress requires, as a
formal matter, allegation and proof of contingent emotional injury, "the tort ... in practice tends to
reduce to a single element-the outrageousness of the defendant's conduct." Givelber, supra note 42,
at 42-43.
71. See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd in part and rev'd in
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logically distinct, for the intrusion tort focuses narrowly on policing what
Simmel calls that "ideal sphere [which] lies around every human being"
and which "cannot be penetrated, unless the personality value of the
individual is thereby destroyed,"72 whereas the tort of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress focuses upon preventing the intentional viola-
tion of civility rules for the purpose of causing harm to the personality.
Thus the latter tort prohibits evil intentions, while the former guards
against the penetration of private space. But this formal distinction is
less helpful than it might appear, for the penetration of private space is
often not "highly offensive" unless perpetrated with improper intent,73
and so the boundary between the two torts is obscured.
That the common law lives comfortably with such ambiguity is evi-
dence that it is primarily interested in maintaining the forms of respect
deemed essential for social life, and relatively indifferent to whether par-
ticular forms of respect should be denominated as "privacy." Certain
kinds of respect are in ordinary discourse understood to be concerned
with privacy, and the common law roughly incorporates this understand-
ing into the formal elements of the privacy tort. But the common law
makes no great effort systematically to analyze that understanding so as
to isolate the "private" as a distinct object of protection.
The intrusion branch of the privacy tort has intuitively obvious con-
nections to ordinary understandings of privacy. Certainly in common
usage a basic meaning of privacy is that of a private space, like a bath-
room or a home, from which others may be excluded.74 The forms of
respect that underlie such spaces are well displayed by Erving Goffman
in his essay on The Territories of the Self. 75 Goffman defines a territory
as a "field of things" or a "preserve" to which an individual can claim
"entitlement to possess, control, use, or dispose of."76 Territories are
defined not by neutral, objective factors, like feet or inches, but instead
part, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973); Fletcher v. Florida Publishing Co., 319 So. 2d 100 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1975), rev'd, 340 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930 (1977); Pemberton v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 66 Md. App. 133, 502 A.2d 1101 (Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 306 Md. 289,
508 A.2d 488, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 984 (1986); Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255
N.E.2d 765, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1970); Mead, supra note 68, at 49.
72. G. SIMMEL, supra note 66, at 321.
73. See, e.g., Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 40-41, 133 N.E.2d 340, 343 (1956) (violation of
right to privacy where defendant acted "willfully or intentionally for the purpose of producing
mental anguish and pain").
74. As Joel Feinberg notes:
The root idea in the generic concept of privacy is that of a privileged territory or domain in
which an individual person has the exclusive authority of determining whether another
may enter, and if so, when and for how long, and under what conditions. Within this area,
the individual person is-pick your metaphor-boss, sovereign, owner.
J. FEINBERG, OFFENSE TO OTHERS 24 (1985) (citation omitted).
75. E. GOFFMAN, The Territories of the Self in RELATIONS IN PUBLIC: MICROSTUDIEs OF
THE PUBLIC ORDER 28 (1971).
76. Id. at 28-29.
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are contextual. Their boundaries have a "socially determined variabil-
ity" and depend upon such "factors as local population density, purpose
of the approacher .... character of the social occasion, and so forth."
77
That territories are defined by normative and social factors, as
opposed to "neutral" or "objective" criteria, is well illustrated by the
recent case of Huskey v. National Broadcasting Co., 78 in which Arnold
Huskey, a prisoner at the United States Penitentiary at Marion, Illinois,
sued NBC because its cameras had filmed him while in the prison's
"exercise cage," a room roughly twenty-five feet by thirty feet with a
concrete floor and surrounding fence. Huskey was wearing only gym
shorts, leaving several distinctive tattoos exposed. Huskey claimed that
NBC had intruded on his seclusion, because he had expected that "the
only ones able to see him would be persons 'to whom he might be
exposed as a necessary result of his incarceration': the guard assigned to
watch him, other prison personnel and other inmates."' 79 NBC argued
that it could not "be held liable for intrusion upon Huskey's seclusion
because he was not secluded"; the exercise cage was "'open to view and
used by other prisoners.' ,80
The court refused to accept the "neutral" fact of Huskey's visibility
as determinative of the territory from which he could rightfully exclude
others:
Huskey's visibility to some people does not strip him of the right to
remain secluded from others. Persons are exposed to family members
and invited guests in their own homes, but that does not mean they have
opened the door to television cameras. Prisons are largely closed sys-
tems, within which prisoners may become understandably inured to the
gaze of staff and other prisoners, while at the same time feeling justifiably
secluded from the outside world (at least in certain areas not normally
visited by outsiders).8
The court concluded that the success of Huskey's claim would have to
await further development of the factual record regarding the actual cus-
toms and usages of the exercise cage. These customs and usages, not the
"objective" facts of visibility, secrecy, anonymity, and solitude, defined
the territory in which Huskey could legally claim the right to undis-
turbed "seclusion."
Goffman's central and profound point is that territories, defined in
this normative way, are a vehicle for the exchange of meaning; they serve
77. Id. at 31, 40. Goffman makes clear that the conduct of the individual claiming the
territory is also relevant to the social recognition of the territory. Id. at 41-44.
78. 632 F. Supp. 1282 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
79. Id. at 1285 (quoting the Complaint at 1 9).
80. Id. at 1287 (quoting Respondent NBC's Memorandum at 8).
81. Id. at 1288.
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as a kind of language, a "ritual idiom,"82 through which persons commu-
nicate with one another. We indicate respect for a person by acknowl-
edging his territory; conversely, we invite intimacy by waiving our claims
to a territory and allowing others to draw close. An embrace, for exam-
ple, can signify human compassion or desire, but if it is unwelcome it can
instead be experienced as a demeaning indignity.83 The identical physi-
cal action can have these two very different meanings only because its
significance is constituted by the norms of respect which define personal
space. It is characteristic of "territories of the self" to be used in this
"dual way, with comings-into-touch avoided as a means of maintaining
respect and engaged in as a means of establishing regard."84
Goffman's analysis suggests that by lending authoritative sanction
to the territories of the self, the tort of intrusion performs at least three
distinct functions. First, it safeguards the respect due individuals by vir-
tue of their territorial claims.85 Second, it maintains the language or "rit-
ual idiom" constituted by territories, thus conserving the particular
meanings carried by that language. Third, the tort preserves the ability
of individuals to speak through the idiom of territories, and this ability,
as Goffman notes,
is somehow central to the subjective sense that the individual has con-
ceming his selfhood, his ego, the part of himself with which he identifies
his positive feelings. And here the issue is not whether a preserve is
exclusively maintained, or shared, or given up entirely, but rather the
role the individual is allowed in determining what happens to his claim.8 6
An individual's ability to press or to waive territorial claims, his ability to
choose respect or intimacy, is deeply empowering for his sense of himself
as an independent or autonomous person. As Jeffrey Reiman has noted,
"[p]rivacy is an essential part of the complex social practice by means of
which the social group recognizes-and communicates to the individ-
82. E. GOFFMAN, supra note 75, at 60.
83. See Craker v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 36 Wis. 657, 660 (1875) (railroad company liable for
the "indignity" of the unsolicited advances of conductor).
84. E. GOFFMAN, supra note 75, at 60-61. For commentators making a similar point, see C.
FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES: PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL AND SOCIAL CHOICE 142 (1970);
Rachels, Why Privacy is Important, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 323, 327-29 (1975).
85. Since such respect is constitutive of the self, it is not surprising to find the early cases
describing privacy norms in the language of "natural law":
The right of privacy has its foundation in the instincts of nature. It is recognized
intuitively, consciousness being the witness that can be called to establish its existence.
Any person whose intellect is in a normal condition recognizes at once that as to each
individual member of society there are matters private and there are matters public so far
as the individual is concerned. Each individual as instinctively resents any encroachment
by the public upon his rights which are of a private nature as he does the withdrawal of
those of his rights which are of a public nature. A right of privacy in matters purely
private is therefore derived from natural law.
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 194, 50 S.E. 68, 69-70 (1905).
86. E. GOFFMAN, supra note 75, at 60.
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ual-that his existence is his own. And this is a precondition of
personhood. '8 7
There is now a fierce debate in law and political philosophy between,
speaking roughly, liberals and communitarians.88 The former stress
those aspects of the self which are independent and autonomous, the lat-
ter emphasize those aspects which are embedded in social norms and
values. In the intrusion tort, however, this debate is miraculously tran-
scended, for the tort presides over precisely those social norms which
enable an autonomous self to emerge.
Some norms, like those prohibiting murder, cannot be waived by the
consent of individuals. But the norms policed by the intrusion tort are
different. They mark the boundaries that distinguish respect from inti-
macy, and their very ability to serve this function depends upon their
capacity for being enforced or waived in appropriate circumstances. In
the power to make such personal choices inheres the very essence of the
independent self. This mysterious fusion of civility and autonomy lies at
the heart of the intrusion tort.8 9
B. The Legal Enforcement of Civility Rules: Hegemony and Community
Our analysis so far has assumed that the common law incorporates
civility rules from society in some relatively unproblematic way. The
assumption reflects the common law's understanding of its own project.
The elements of intrusion require it to enforce rules of civility as per-
ceived by the "reasonable person," who is meant to embody "the general
level of moral judgment of the community." The discernment and appli-
cation of these civility rules is in general entrusted to a jury, which is a
randomly selected group of persons designed to be representative of the
community. 90 The prevailing image is that of a legal system transpar-
87. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26, 39 (1976).
88. For an overview of this debate, see Gutmann, Communitarian Critics of Liberalism, 14
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 308 (1985); Thigpen & Downing, Liberalism and the Communitarian Critique,
31 AM. J. POL. Sci. 637 (1987); Wallach, Liberals, Communitarians, and the Tasks of Political
Theory, 15 POL. THEORY 581 (1987); Note, A Communitarian Defense of Group Libel Laws, 101
HARV. L. REV. 682, 689-92 (1988).
89. That fusion has been well captured by Edward Shils:
Intrusions on privacy are baneful because they interfere with an individual in his
disposition of what belongs to him. The "social space" around an individual ... belong[s]
to him. He does not acquire [it] through purchase or inheritance. He possesses [it] and is
entitled to possess [it] by virtue of the charisma which is inherent in his existence as an
individual soul-as we say nowadays, in his individuality-and which is inherent in his
membership in the civil community. [It] belong[s] to him by virtue of his humanity and
civility. A society that claims to be both humane and civil is committed to [its] respect.
When its practice departs from that respect, it also departs to that degree from humanity
and civility.
Shils, Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicissitudes, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 281, 306 (1966)
(emphasis in original).
90. On the distinction between judge and jury with respect to the discernment and application
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ently reflecting community norms.
This image, however, requires three important qualifications. First,
social life is thick with territorial norms that contribute substantially to
"the concrete density and vitality of interaction." 91 For obvious reasons,
however, the common law can maintain only a small subset of these
norms. The law itself claims to enforce only the most important of them,
only those whose breach would be "highly offensive." This selection cri-
terion serves the interest of legal institutions, which otherwise would be
inundated with trivial lawsuits. It also, and somewhat less obviously,
preserves the flexibility and vitality of social life, which undoubtedly
would be hardened and otherwise altered for the worse if every indiscre-
tion could be transformed into formal legal action.
Second, the legal system must translate civility rules into workable
legal doctrine. The complex, tacit, and contextual territorial principles
described by Goffman must be stiffened into the relatively clear, explicit,
and precise elements of a formal cause of action. This transmutation is
captured by Paul Bohannan's notion of "double institutionalization,"
which means that the law must domesticate general social norms so that
they are compatible with the needs and functioning of the legal system.92
Civility rules must thus assume the character of legal doctrine; they must
be formulated according to the logic of the rule of law, which means that
they must be articulated in such a way "that people will be able to be
guided by [them]." 93 They must be capable of generating rules of prece-
dent to constrain future judicial decisions. These transformations imply
that legal doctrine is often, as Bohannan puts it, "out of phase with soci-
ety."9 4 If the objective of the law is to shape and alter social norms, this
of community norms, see Post, Defaming Public Officials: On Doctrine and Legal History, 1987 AM.
B. FOUND. REs. J. 539, 552-54.
91. G. SIMMEL, supra note 66, at 323.
92. Bohannan states:
Customs are norms or rules ... about the ways in which people must behave if social
institutions are to perform their tasks and society is to endure. All institutions (including
legal institutions) develop customs. Some customs, in some societies, are
reinstitutionalized at another level: they are restated for the more precise purposes of legal
institutions. When this happens, therefore, law may be regarded'as a custom that has been
restated in order to make it amenable to the activities of the legal institutions.
Bohannan, The Differing Realms of the Law, 67 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 33, 35-36 (1965) (emphasis
in original).
93. J. RAz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 210, 213 (1979).
94. Bohannan, supra note 92, at 37. Bohannan notes:
Indeed, the more highly developed the legal institutions, the greater the lack of phase,
which not only results from the constant reorientation of the primary institutions, but also
is magnified by the very dynamic of the legal institutions themselves.
Thus, it is the very nature of law, and its capacity to 'do something about' the primary
social institutions, that creates the lack of phase.... It is the fertile dilemma of law that it
must always be out of step with society, but that people must always (because they work
better with fewer contradictions, if for no other reason) attempt to reduce the lack of
phase. Custom must either grow to fit the law or it must actively reject it; law must either
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tension between law and custom is desirable. But if the law's purpose is
to maintain social norms, as is manifestly the case for the common law
tort of intrusion, this dissonance works against the very rationale of the
law. L
Third, and most important, it is something of a fiction to speak of a
single, homogeneous community within a nation as large and diverse as
the United States. There is every reason to expect that civility rules
regarding privacy will differ "among communities, between generations,
and among ethnic, religious, or other social groups, as well as among
individuals." 95 It is said, for example, that Warren and Brandeis wrote
their famous article because Warren, a genuine Boston Brahmin, was
outraged that common newspapers had had the effrontery to report on
his private entertainments.96 As such the class content of the privacy
norms advanced by the article is plain. 7 That content is also explicit in
the writings of E. L. Godkin, which Warren and Brandeis cite with
approval. Godkin characterized privacy as "one of the luxuries of civili-
zation, which is not only unsought for but unknown in primitive or bar-
barous societies."9" He illustrated the social consequences of the point
by reciting the
story of the traveller in the hotel in the Western mining town, who
pinned a shirt across his open window to screen himself from the loafers
on the piazza while performing his toilet; after a few minutes he saw it
drawn aside roughly by a hand from without, and on asking what it
meant, a voice answered, 'We want to know what there is so darned pri-
vate going on in there?' The loafers resented his attempts at seclusion in
grow to fit the custom, or it must ignore or suppress it. It is in these very interstices that
social growth and social decay take place.
Id. (citation omitted).
95. Anderson v. Fisher Broadcasting Co., 300 Or. 452, 461, 712 P.2d 803, 809 (1986).
'Class, occupation, education, and status within various communities and organizations may
significantly affect the way in which an individual thinks of himself as a 'private' individual and what
he understands by 'the moral right to privacy.' ..... Id. at 461 n.8, 712 P.2d at 809 n.8 (quoting
Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68
Cornell L. Rev. 291, 349 n.304 (1983), quoting Velecky, The Concept of Privacy, in PRIVACY 25 (J.
Young ed. 1983)).
96. A. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 70 (1956).
97. "The Warren-Brandeis proposal was essentially a rich man's plea to the press to stop its
gossiping and snooping .... " D. PEMBER, supra note 6, at 23. In the classic tones of the
beleaguered aristocrat, Warren and Brandeis complain:
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of
decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a
trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery. To satisfy a prurient taste the
details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the columns of the daily papers. To
occupy the indolent, column upon column is filled with idle gossip, which can only be
procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 6, at 196.
98. Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen: To His Own Reputation, SCRIaNER'S MAG., July 1890,
at 58, 65.
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their own rude way .... 99
Godkin's story is plainly meant to demonstrate the class basis of
privacy norms. In a world in which privacy norms are heterogeneous,
however, the common law must choose which norms to enforce. It must
pick sides in the confrontation between the traveller and the loafers. And
this choice cannot be avoided by an appeal to the judgment of the "rea-
sonable person," for it must first be determined to which community the
reasonable person belongs.
In defamation law, the question of which community the law will
serve is explicitly thematized as a doctrinal issue. Some courts have said
that the law will uphold the values of "a considerable and respectable
class in the community";" ° others have adopted the perspective of
"'right-thinking persons.'"101 But this question is not explicitly
addressed in the doctrine of the more recent tort of invasion of privacy,
which speaks only in the majestic and abstract accents of the "reasonable
person." Thus the civility rules recognized by the common law tort of
intrusion are presented as "universalist norms, applicable to the society
as a whole rather than to a few functional or segmental sectors, highly
generalized in terms of principles and standards."10
2
Whether this claim to universalist status is justified, however, can-
not be determined from the mere fact of a judicial decision. It could be
that the civility rules enforced by a judicial decision genuinely are expres-
sive of generally accepted norms in a society. I doubt, for example, if
anyone would seriously question Eastman's assertion that eavesdropping
on marital bedrooms constitutes a serious violation of generally accepted
civility rules. But the converse could also be true, and it is possible that
the civility rules enforced by a particular court may be understood as
hegemonically imposed by one dominant cultural group onto others.0 3
This suggests that care must be taken in evaluating the universalist
pretensions of the tort of intrusion. Under conditions of cultural hetero-
geneity, the common law can become a powerful instrument for effacing
cultural and normative differences." 4 The significance of this efface-
99. Id. at 66.
100. Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 190 (1909).
101. Kimmerle v. New York Evening Journal, Inc., 262 N.Y. 99, 102, 186 N.E. 217, 218 (1933)
(quoting Sydney v. MacFadden Newspaper Publishing Corp., 242 N.Y. 208, 212, 151 N.E. 209, 210
(1926)); see Post, supra note 43, at 714-15.
102. T. PARSONS, SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY AND MODERN SOCIETY 510 (1967).
103. On the distinction between expressive and hegemonic functions of law, see Post, Cultural
Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy, and the First Amendment, 76 CALIF. L. REv. 297,
299-300 (1988).
104. A good illustration of this potential is the case of Bitsie v. Walston, 85 N.M. 655, 658, 515
P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 85 N.M. 639, 515 P.2d 643 (1973), a decision interpreting the
"appropriation" branch of the privacy tort, in which the court held that the "traditional" norms of
the Navajo tribe could not be equated with the "ordinary sensibilities" of the reasonable person. See
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ment, however, lies not only in its hegemonic consequences, but also in
the commitment that it reveals to the task of constructing a common
community through the process of authoritatively articulating rules of
civility. The common law tort purports to speak for a community. Yet
this very ambition authoritatively to forge a community simultaneously
requires the common law to displace deviant communities. Under such
conditions, community and hegemony necessarily entail each other.
III
THE TORT OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
The core of the invasion of privacy tort is commonly understood to
lie in the branch of the tort that attempts to regulate the publicizing of
private life. 105 The elements of that branch are described by the Restate-
ment in the following manner:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another
is subject to liability to the other for invasion of privacy, if the matter
publicized is of a kind that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.106
This branch of the tort (which for convenience I shall call simply
"public disclosure") differs from intrusion in three fundamental ways.
First, intrusion concerns the physical actions of a defendant, whereas
public disclosure involves the dissemination of information. The tort in
Eastman was complete when the defendant placed the eavesdropping
device in the plaintiffs' marital bedroom. Liability did not depend upon
whether the defendant actually listened to the device or acquired any
information from it, or whether he revealed any such information to
others. An essential element of the tort of public disclosure, on the other
hand, is a defendant's public disclosure of private information. The tort
of public disclosure thus regulates forms of communication rather than
physical behavior.
Second, whereas both intrusion and public disclosure turn on what a
"reasonable person" would find "highly offensive," the tort of public dis-
closure penalizes only certain kinds of highly offensive revelations of pri-
vate life; namely, those in which a defendant has given "publicity" to the
offensive information. To give "publicity" to information is to make it
also Benally v. Hundred Arrows Press, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 969, 982 (D.N.M. 1985), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Benally v. Amon Carter Museum of Western Art, 858 F.2d 618 (10th Cir. 1988).
105. See, e.g., Kalven, supra note 42, at 333.
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). Once again, it is important to stress
that the specific elements of this tort can vary from state to state, but it is fair to conclude that the
Restatement version contains by far the most common array of elements.
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public. This concept of the public has no analogue in the tort of
intrusion.
Third, the tort of public disclosure requires a plaintiff to establish
that the offensive information "is not of legitimate concern to the pub-
lic." This concept of "legitimate concern" also has no analogue in the
tort of intrusion.
In the following sections of this essay I shall address these three
important differences.
A. The Offensive Disclosure of Private Facts: Civility and the
Protection of Information Preserves
The public disclosure tort regulates forms of communication rather
than behavior. To be actionable, a communication must be about "a
matter concerning the private life of another" and the matter must be "of
a kind that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person."107 At first
glance, these two criteria appear to concern only the content of informa-
tion contained in a communication. Either the information is about "pri-
vate life," or it is not; either the information is "highly offensive," or it is
not. In fact, however, these two criteria do not concern merely the infor-
mation that may be contained in a communication. They serve instead
as standards for the evaluation of communicative acts, and are used to
assess not merely communicative content, but also such varied aspects of
these acts as their timing, justification, addressees, form, and general
context.
This distinction between the regulation of information and the regu-
lation of communicative acts is illustrated by the facts of a venerable
case, Brents v. Morgan, 10 which was the first decision to recognize the
invasion of privacy tort in the state of Kentucky. It appears that in 1926
in the town of Lebanon, Kentucky, W.R. Morgan, a veterinarian, owed a
debt of $49.67 to George Brents, a garage mechanic. Brents made sev-
eral unsuccessful efforts to collect the debt, and in frustration finally put
up a sign, five feet by eight feet, in the window of his garage facing one of
the principal streets of the town. The sign stated:
Notice.
Dr. W. R. Morgan owes an account here of $49.6Z And if promises
would pay an account this account would have been settled long ago. This
account will be advertised as long as it remains unpaid. 109
Dr. Morgan sued Brents for damages, alleging that the sign had "caused
him great mental pain, humiliation, and mortification," that it exposed
"him to public contempt, ridicule, aversion, and disgrace," and that it
107. Id.
108. 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927).
109. Id. at 766, 229 S.W. at 968 (emphasis in original).
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had caused "an evil opinion of him in the minds of tradesmen and the
public generally."'11 Morgan's complaint was styled in the language of a
typical libel or defamation suit. But in Kentucky, as elsewhere, truth
was a complete defense to an action for defamation, and Dr. Morgan did
in fact owe Brents $49.67.
The Kentucky Supreme Court, however, held that although truth
may be a defense against an action for defamation, it does not constitute
a defense against the "new branch of the law [which] has been developed
in the last few years [and] which is denominated the right of privacy." 111
The right of privacy concerned "the right of a person to be free from
unwarranted publicity, or the right to live without unwarranted interfer-
ence by the public about matters with which the public is not necessarily
concerned." '11 2 The court concluded that Brents' posting of the sign vio-
lated Morgan's right of privacy. The facts of the case have been cited
ever since as a paradigmatic illustration of invasion of privacy., 1 3
The Restatement would have us ask two questions about the content
of Brents' notice. First, we are instructed to inquire whether the infor-
mation on the sign concerns "the private life" of Dr. Morgan. This
inquiry, however, is somewhat puzzling, for it is not certain in what sense
Dr. Morgan's debt, and his refusal to pay it, are "private" facts. Cer-
tainly these facts were known to Brents and were not viewed as "secret"
by either party. And surely Brents would have been within his rights to
discuss them with his wife or his banker or his accountant. We would
even feel nothing improper about his relating them to a perfect stranger
who was attempting to determine the worth of Brents' garage in the
expectation of purchasing the business.
This suggests that we cannot determine whether the information on
the sign concerns "private" facts simply by examining the content of the
information; we must instead have some notion of the circumstances sur-
rounding the revelation of that information. The same information can
be viewed as "private" with respect to some kinds of communications,
but not with respect to others. To say that the information on Brents'
sign concerns "private life," therefore, is really to say that he should not
have revealed it in the manner in which he did.
This conclusion is dramatically illustrated by the line of cases hold-
110. Id.
111. Id. at 770, 299 S.W. at 969.
112. Id. at 770, 299 S.W. at 970. The court quoted language to the effect that the foundation of
the right of privacy
"is in the conception of an inviolate personality and personal immunity. It is considered as
a natural and an absolute or pure right springing from the instincts of nature. It is of that
class of rights which every human being had in his natural state and which he did not
surrender by becoming a member of organized society."
Id. at 773, 299 S.W. at 971 (quoting 21 Ruling Case Law § 3, at 1197-98 (1929)).
113. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment a, illustration 2 (1977).
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ing that a defendant who reveals the past crimes of a rehabilitated felon
can be liable for invasion of privacy. The California Supreme Court, for
example, has held in Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Association "4 that a
plaintiff who is leading an exemplary and respectable life can bring an
action for public disclosure on the basis of a story in a national magazine
revealing that he has been convicted of hijacking a truck eleven years
earlier."1 ' The Court distinguished between publishing "the facts of past
crimes," and publishing the identity "of the actor in reports of long past
crimes."" 6 Liability could be predicated on the latter communication,
but not on the former.
It is obvious, however, that the identity of the plaintiff was, at the
time of his conviction, as "public" a fact as the events of his crime. The
characterization of the information as "private," therefore, cannot possi-
bly turn solely upon either its content or the extent to which it has previ-
ously been disseminated. It must instead depend upon an assessment of
the total context of the communicative act by which that information is
revealed. The court's conclusion makes sense only if it is read as resting
on the perception that it was somehow deeply inappropriate for the
defendant to have revealed the plaintiff's identity in that way, or at that
time, or to that audience.
114. 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971).
115. In 1975 the United States Supreme Court held in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469 (1975), that the first amendment prohibited a plaintiff from suing for damages for invasion
of privacy on the basis of "the publication of truthful information contained in official court records
open to public inspection." Id. at 495. Subsequent cases, however, as well as the 1977 edition of the
Restatement, have continued to view liability as appropriate if the publication of such information
occurs after a sufficient lapse of time. See, eg., Conklin v. Sloss, 86 Cal. App. 3d 241, 247-48, 150
Cal. Rptr. 121, 125 (Ct. App. 1978); Roshto v. Hebert, 439 So. 2d 428, 431 (La. 1983);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment k (1977); cf Capra v. Thoroughbred Racing
Ass'n, 787 F.2d 463 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1017 (1986). The Restatement provides that if
publicity is given to a public event after a sufficient lapse of time, it must be determined
whether the publicity goes to unreasonable lengths in revealing facts about one who has
resumed the private, lawful and unexciting life led by the great bulk of the community.
This may be true, for example, when there is a disclosure of the present name and identity
of a reformed criminal and his new life is utterly ruined by revelation of a past that he has
put behind him .... [The question is to be determined upon the basis of community
standards and mores.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment k (1977).
The Supreme Court has itself recently signalled that the holding of Cox is to be narrowly
parsed. In Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989), the Court emphasized that Cox did not
"exhaustively" resolve the "tension between the right which the First Amendment accords to a free
press, on the one hand, and the protections which various statutes and common-law doctrines
accord to personal privacy against the publication of truthful information, on the other." Id. at
2607. The Court specifically refused to hold that "truthful publication is automatically constitution-
ally protected, or that there is no zone of personal privacy within which the State may protect the
individual from intrusion by the press, or even that a State may never punish publication of the name
of a victim of a sexual offense." Id. at 2613. It held only that "where a newspaper publishes truthful
information which it has lawfully obtained, punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only
when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order .... Id.
116. Briscoe, 4 Cal. 3d at 537, 483 P.2d at 39-40, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 871-72 (emphasis in original).
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The California Supreme Court had in fact explicitly articulated this
sense of inappropriateness in Melvin v. Reid, 117 the precedent relied upon
by Briscoe. Melvin upheld a plaintiff's claim of invasion of privacy
against a defendant who had made a movie about the plaintiff's past life
that accurately identified her as a notorious prostitute and an accused
felon. 118 The court branded the movie as one made in "willful and wan-
ton disregard of that charity which should actuate us in our social inter-
course and which should keep us from unnecessarily holding another up
to the scorn and contempt of upright members of society." ' 9
If the conclusion that a communicative act reveals the "private life"
of a plaintiff ultimately turns on whether, under the circumstances, the
communication wantonly disregards social norms of appropriateness, so
also, and in a more obvious way, does the second question propounded
by the Restatement. In assessing whether Brents' sign is an actionable
invasion of privacy, the Restatement would have us ask whether the
information contained in the sign "is of a kind that would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person."' 120
The Restatement's formulation of the question invites us to focus on
the content of the sign and to assess it according to community norms.
We might say, for example, that community norms view the commission
of a crime as inherently stigmatic, and hence that the communication of
such information would be highly offensive. But the facts of Brents do
not fit easily within this understanding of the question. Dr. Morgan's
debt and his delinquency on that debt are not "inherently" offensive in
the same way as would be his commission of a crime. Information about
the debt, for example, would not be highly offensive as between Morgan
and his banker, or as between Brents and Morgan, or as between Morgan
and his wife or children. Indeed, twenty-four years after Brents the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court held in Voneye v. Turner 2' that it was neither
offensive nor an invasion of privacy to communicate the fact of a debt
and the debtor's refusal to pay it to the debtor's employer. 22 As one
117. 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (Ct. App. 1931).
118. Id. at 292, 297 P. at 93-94.
119. Id. at 291, 297 P. at 93.
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
121. 240 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1951).
122. The court stated that conveying such information would not impair "'the standing of an
individual and bring him into disrepute with right thinking people in the community.'" The court
explained:
A debtor when he creates an obligation must know that his creditor expects to collect it,
and the ordinary man realizes that most employers expect their employees to meet their
obligations and that when they fall behind in so doing the employer may be asked to take
the matter up with them. Indeed, most debtors would prefer to have their delinquencies
referred to their employers in a courteous and inconspicuous manner rather than to have a
suit filed against them and their wages garnished.
Id. at 591, 593 (quoting in part Neaton v. Lewis Apparel Stores, 267 A.D. 728, 48 N.Y.S.2d 492, 494
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court put it, "An employer 'is not in a category with the general public
which cannot have any legitimate interest in a purely private matter
between a creditor and a debtor,' "123 in large part because
when one accepts credit, he impliedly consents for the creditor to take
reasonable steps 'to pursue his debtor and persuade payment ....' It is
only when the creditor's actions constitute oppressive treatment of a
debtor, including the unreasonable giving of undue publicity to private
debts, that such actions have been held to be an actionable invasion of a
debtor's right of privacy. 124
The offensiveness of the sign in Brents, therefore, is not merely a
matter of the content of the information which it contains, but also of the
"oppressive" manner in which it disseminates that information. This dis-
tinction is illustrated by the recent case of Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's,
Brooks Bros., 125 in which a woman sued her surgeon for public disclosure
because he had shown "before" and "after" pictures of her cosmetic sur-
gery on a television program. The trial court had directed a verdict for
the defendant, in part on the theory that "the photographs were not
highly offensive because there was nothing 'uncomplimentary or unsa-
vory' about them." 1 26 The appellate court reversed, stating that the trial
court had misconceived the issue. The question was not whether the
content of the photographs was offensive, but rather "whether the publi-
city of Mrs. Vassiliades' surgery was highly offensive to a reasonable
person." 1
27
This formulation of the offensiveness requirement, however, essen-
tially asks whether the communicative act at issue, considered in its full
context, is "highly offensive."' 128 But this inquiry is virtually identical to
that which underlies the "private facts" requirement. Both focus broadly
on the appropriateness of the communicative act in question, rather than
narrowly on the specific content of that communication. The distinct
contribution of the "offensiveness" requirement is primarily that it makes
(App. Div. 1944)). The holding of the Kentucky court is typical of decisions dealing with this issue.
See S. HOFSTADTER & G. HOROWITZ, supra note 51, at 173-76.
123. Harrison v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 264 F. Supp. 89, 92 (D.S.C. 1967) (quoting Patton
v. Jacobs, 118 Ind. App. 358, 78 N.E.2d 789 (App. 1948)).
124. Id. (quoting Cunningham v. Securities Investment Co. of St. Louis, 278 F.2d 600, 604 (5th
Cir. 1960)).
125. 492 A.2d 580 (D.C. 1985).
126. Id. at 588.
127. Id.
128. Consider, in this light, the ambiguity of the Restatement's own gloss on the "offensiveness"
requirement:
The rule stated in this Section gives protection only against unreasonable publicity, of a
kind highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable man. The protection afforded to the
plaintiff's interest in his privacy must be relative to the customs of the time and place, to
the occupation of the plaintiff and to the habits of his neighbors and fellow citizens.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment c (1977).
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explicit the notion that the law will not regulate every inappropriate reve-
lation, but only those which are "highly offensive." Thus the public dis-
closure tort, like the intrusion tort, penalizes only serious transgressions.
As with intrusion, the elements of the public disclosure branch of
the tort roughly approximate an everyday understanding of privacy.
When we speak in ordinary language about violations of privacy, we
often have in mind inappropriate revelations of intimate facts that ought
not to be disclosed. 2 9 The twin requirements of "private facts" and
"offensiveness" are a rough attempt to specify when such revelations are
inappropriate. But, as with intrusion, the public disclosure tort does not
depend upon a neutral or objective measure of when disclosures should
be subject to legal liability. Instead the tort draws upon the social norms
that govern the flow of information in modem society. And these norms,
like those that define private space, have a "socially determined variabil-
ity," and so are sensitive to such "factors" as the "character of the social
occasion,"' 130 the purpose, timing, and status of the person who makes
the disclosure, the status and purposes of the addressee of the disclosure,
and so on. Information about a debtor, which may be perfectly appropri-
ate to disclose to his employer or banker or wife, would be inappropriate
to disclose to his neighbors. Information that may be widely known in
some circles, may be inappropriate to reveal in others.
We can understand information, then, as confined within "bounda-
ries" 131 that are normatively determined. These boundaries function
analogously to those which define the spatial territories analyzed by
Goffman. And indeed, Goffman specifically notes that one kind of terri-
tory is an "information preserve," which contains the "set of facts about
himself to which an individual expects to control access," and which is
"[t]raditionally treated under the heading of 'privacy.' 132 Goffman's
point is that just as individuals expect to control certain spatial territo-
ries, so they expect to control certain informational territories. The
almost physical apprehension of this informational space is evident, for
example, in Warren and Brandeis' famous complaint that "[t]he press is
overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of
decency."' 3 3 Because the boundaries of an individual's informational
129. Such revelations violate what Elizabeth Beardsley has termed "the right of selective
disclosure"; in Beardsley's view, "selective disclosure constitutes the conceptual core of the norm of
privacy." Beardsley, Privacy: Autonomy and Selective Disclosure, in PRIVACY 56, 70 (J. Pennock &
J. Chapman eds. 1971) (NoMos XIII).
130. E. GOFFMAN, supra note 75, at 31, 40.
131. Seipp, English Judicial Recognition of a Right to Privacy, 3 OxF. J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 333
(1983).
132. E. GOFFMAN, supra note 75, at 38-39.
133. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 6, at 196. For another example of this almost physical
apprehension, see Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 774, 299 S.W. 967, 971 (1927) (defining a
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space are "relative to the customs of the time and place, and ... deter-
mined by the norm of the ordinary man,"' 34 the public disclosure branch
of the tort can be said to maintain those civility rules which establish
information preserves, in the same way that the intrusion branch upholds
the civility rules which define spatial territories.
Information preserves, like spatial territories, provide a normative
framework for the development of individual personality. Just as we feel
violated when our bedrooms are invaded, so we experience the inappro-
priate disclosure of private information "as pollutions or defilements."'35
Although the social norms that define information territories concern
communications between defendants and third parties, we nevertheless
depend upon those norms, and experience their breach to be "just as
violent and morally inadmissible as listening behind closed doors."
136
Thus courts enforcing the public disclosure tort see themselves as pro-
tecting persons from "indecent and vulgar" communications that would
"outrage or cause mental suffering, shame or humiliation to a person of
ordinary sensibilities,"' 37 or that would have the effect of "degrading a
person by laying his life open to public view,"1 38 or that would threaten
plaintiffs with a "literal loss of self-identity."'
' 39
The civility rules which delineate information preserves must there-
fore be understood as forms of respect that are integral to both individual
and social personality. They comprise an important part of the obliga-
tions that members of a community owe to each other. This perspective
helps to clarify a perplexing feature of the public disclosure tort. The
tort has always seemed somewhat strange because a plaintiff can recover
damages for the public disclosure of "private" facts only by definitively
and widely re-broadcasting those same "private" facts through an official
adjudicative process. Thus while few may have heard of Mrs.
Vassiliades' plastic surgery as a result of her doctor's announcements
over the television-in fact Mrs. Vassiliades could identify only two per-
sons who had seen the broadcast-her surgical alteration is now forever
imprinted in the law books, and the very process of her trial no doubt
made the fact of her surgery known to many of her acquaintances who
violation of the right to privacy as "interference with another's seclusion by subjecting him to
unwarranted and undesired publicity").
134. Wheeler v. P. Sorensen Mfg. Co., 415 S.W.2d 582, 585 (Ky. 1967).
135. Schoeman, Privacy and Intimate Information, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF
PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 403, 406 (F. Schoeman ed. 1984) (emphasis in original).
136. G. SIMMEL, supra note 66, at 323.
137. Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 276 Ala. 380, 382, 162 So. 2d 474, 476 (1964).
138. Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 139 Cal. App. 3d 118, 126, 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 767 (Ct.
App. 1983) (quoting Nimmer, The Right to Speak From Times to Time: First Amendment Theory
Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935, 959 (1968)) (emphasis omitted).
139. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 534, 483 P.2d 34, 37, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866,
869 (1971).
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otherwise would not have been aware of it. If the public disclosure tort is
understood simply as a mechanism for protecting the secrecy of private
facts, it would seem to be entirely self-defeating. 40 But if the tort is
instead understood as a means of obtaining vindication for the infringe-
ment of information preserves, the disclosure of information in the
course of a judicial action may be of only secondary importance so long
as the plaintiff is ultimately reintegrated into that chain of ceremony
which defines and embraces members of the community.
This suggests that the public disclosure tort fulfills the first two of
the three functions we previously identified for the intrusion tort-safe-
guarding the respect due individuals by virtue of their territorial claims,
and protecting the "ritual idiom" through which such respect finds social
expression. 14 1 The idiom at issue in the context of public disclosure,
however, appears somewhat different than that at issue in intrusion. This
is because intrusion regulates dyadic relationships, which involve the
appropriateness of direct interactions between plaintiffs and defendants,
whereas public disclosure regulates triadic relationships, which involve
the appropriateness of defendants' disclosures of private information
about plaintiffs to third party addressees.
This difference has significant consequences. The intrusion tort reg-
ulates situations in which a plaintiff's direct control over whether to
assert or to waive pertinent civility rules is constitutive of the most inti-
mate aspects of his social existence. In public disclosure, on the other
hand, the pertinent civility rules specifically control only the relationship
between a defendant and his audience. It is therefore awkward to speak
of these rules as norms that intrinsically establish the intimate life of a
plaintiff. For this reason the idiom at issue in public disclosure is chiefly
expressive of respect, and does not characteristically function in the
"dual way" of the civility norms protected by intrusion, which mark the
140. See, e.g., Anderson v. Fisher Broadcasting Co., 300 Or. 452, 462, 712 P.2d 803, 809 (1986);
Gavison, supra note 62, at 458.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86. This conclusion implies that it is a great mistake
to view the tort, as some have proposed, as simply a device for protecting secrecy. See, e.g., Posner,
The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 393 (1978); Stigler, An Introduction to Privacy in
Economics and Politics, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 623 (1980). Secrecy depends upon a purely descriptive
concept of privacy, which is quite different from the normative concept that actually underlies the
tort. The difference is most apparent in the fact that the tort deems the right of privacy to be a
"personal" right that "can be maintained only by a living individual whose privacy is invaded."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6521 (1977). Thus corporations, which have secrets to
protect but which are not entitled to claims of social respect, have "no personal right of privacy" and
cannot bring a "cause of action" to enforce any such right. Id. at comment c. For this reason, as
Jack Hirshleifer has argued, privacy in the common law must be interpreted as signifying
"something much broader than secrecy; it suggests.., a particular kind of social structure together
with its supporting social ethic." Hirshleifer, Privacy: Its Origin, Function, and Future, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 649, 649 (1980). By preserving the civility rules that define a community, the tort constitutes
nothing less than "a way of organizing society." Id. at 650 (emphasis in original).
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boundary between respect and intimacy. It follows from this that the
public disclosure tort cannot systematically be linked to the third func-
tion that we attributed to the intrusion tort, that of preserving the ability
of individuals to use the language of territories to develop a sense of their
own autonomy. Viewed in this light, limitations on the tort of public
disclosure carry somewhat less profound social implications than do lim-
itations on the tort of intrusion.
B. The Requirement of "Publicity"." The Tension Between
Civility and Intimacy
The Restatement contains two explicit limitations on the tort of pub-
lic disclosure that have no counterparts in the tort of intrusion. The first
of these limitations is the requirement that a defendant give "publicity"
to the information at issue. The Restatement defines giving "publicity"
as communicating information "to the public at large, or to so many
persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to
become one of public knowledge":
Thus it is not an invasion of the right of privacy, within the rule stated in
this Section, to communicate a fact concerning the plaintiff's private life
to a single person or even to a small group of persons. On the other
hand, any publication in a newspaper or a magazine, even of small circu-
lation, or in a handbill distributed to a large number of persons, or any
broadcast over the radio, or statement made in an address to a large audi-
ence, is sufficient to give publicity within the meaning of the term as it is
used in this Section. The distinction, in other words, is one between pri-
vate and public communication. 142
The effect of this rather stringent requirement is that the public dis-
closure tort differs from intrusion in that it will not offer redress for every
highly offensive infringement of a territory. Although it would be highly
offensive for Mrs. Vassiliades' surgeon to display her "before" and
"after" pictures at a private dinner party, the surgeon would not be sub-
ject to liability under the public disclosure tort as defined by the Restate-
ment, because he would not have given adequate "publicity" to the
pictures.
These consequences are undoubtedly harsh. Perhaps because the
purpose of the publicity requirement is unclear, courts have been uncer-
tain about whether to follow the Restatement by enforcing a strict publi-
city requirement. Although the common law is still evolving, two
distinct approaches can be identified. The first, a minority approach, is
exemplified by the case of Beaumont v. Brown, '43 in which the plaintiff, a
labor safety supervisor for the Michigan Department of Labor, had been
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 652D comment a (1977).
143. 401 Mich. 80, 257 N.W.2d 522 (1977).
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fired for leaving his job for a month of military duty without informing
his supervisor or arranging for someone to take over his duties. The
plaintiff appealed his discharge, and his supervisors wrote a long and
very nasty letter to the Army Reserve, ostensibly seeking to verify the
plaintiff's military duties. The plaintiff alleged that the letter constituted
a tortious invasion of privacy. The Michigan Court of Appeals ruled for
the defendants on the grounds that they had not given "publicity" to the
contents of the letter: "Supportive personnel of the sender and receiver
of a letter do not constitute the 'general public' or a 'large number of
persons.' "" But the Michigan Supreme Court reversed, stating that the
publicity requirement should not degenerate into a "numbers game":
"An invasion of a plaintiff's right to privacy is important if it exposes
private facts to a public whose knowledge of those facts would be embar-
rassing to the plaintiff. Such a public might be... fellow employees, club
members, church members, family, or neighbors." '145 The court even
suggested that "publication of the embarrassing facts to only one person
alone" might meet the test. 146 The issue, therefore, was not the amount
of publicity, but rather whether the publicity was "unnecessary" or
"unreasonable." 14 7
The approach in Beaumont collapses the publicity test into the "pri-
vate" facts and "offensiveness" requirements. These requirements, as we
have seen, concern not merely the content of a communication, but also
the appropriateness of its manner, addressees, and timing. To character-
ize publicity as unnecessary or unreasonable disclosure is simply another
way of saying that the addressees of a communication are inappropriate.
The publicity requirement is thus rendered superfluous; it ceases to inter-
pose any independent barrier to the protection of informational territo-
ries. Hence it is not surprising that those courts which have followed the
Beaumont approach have stressed the "need for flexibility" in interpret-
ing the publicity requirement so that "[e]gregious conduct" may be
"found actionable."' 148
The second understanding of the publicity requirement found in
contemporary cases can be labelled the Restatement approach, for it
attempts to follow the prescriptions of the Restatement and interpret the
publicity requirement in a stringent way. Most jurisdictions have taken
this path. 149 The contrast between the two approaches is well illustrated
144. Beaumont v. Brown, 65 Mich. App. 455, 464, 237 N.W.2d 501, 506 (Ct. App. 1975), rev'd,
401 Mich. 80, 257 N.W.2d 522 (1977).
145. Beaumont, 401 Mich. at 105, 257 N.W.2d at 531.
146. Id. at 100, 257 N.W.2d at 529.
147. Id. at 102-06, 257 N.W.2d at 530-32.
148. McSurely v. McClellan, 753 F.2d 88, 112 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1005 (1985).
149. See, e.g., Tureen v. Equifax, Inc., 571 F.2d 411,419 (8th Cir. 1978); Beard v. Akzona, Inc.,
517 F. Supp. 128, 132-33 (E.D. Tenn. 1981); Vogel v. W. T. Grant Co., 458 Pa. 124, 130-33, 327
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by a comparison of McSurely v. McClellan15 ° and Pemberton v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp. 15' The court in McSurely followed the Beaumont
approach and held that the disclosure to a husband of his wife's private
premarital love letters constituted an actionable invasion of privacy,
despite the fact that the communication was addressed to only one per-
son.152 The court in Pemberton held that the disclosure to a wife of her
husband's extramarital affair was not an actionable invasion of privacy,
because there had been no publicity. 153 Pemberton is a particularly strik-
ing case because of the egregious character of the disclosure, which
formed part of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation's effort to discredit and
harass a labor organizer. 54 Some of the evidence of the extra-marital
affair anonymously sent to the organizer's wife was gathered by an eaves-
dropping device secretly placed in the plaintiff's motel room.155
Pemberton illustrates the powerful implications of the publicity
requirement as codified in the Restatement. It underscores the need to
inquire into the purposes served by that requirement. One hypothesis is
that the requirement is meant to restrict the availability of legal redress
so that not every social indiscretion will carry the potential of formal
legal adjudication. Such a restriction would serve both the interests of
the legal system in not being flooded with suits, and the interests of soci-
ety in maintaining the spontaneity and informality of social life. This
hypothesis, however, lacks explanatory power, for it is not clear why
these anticipated effects should justify the publicity requirement. Those
courts which follow the Beaumont approach are apparently willing to
risk the potential "flood" of litigation and the possible formalization of
social life. In the area of defamation courts have for centuries also been
willing to risk these effects in order to regulate defamatory communica-
tions, even those published only to a single addressee. 56 Why then
would these effects be determinative for those courts which follow the
Restatement approach?
A second hypothesis to explain the publicity requirement is that the
damage to a plaintiff becomes large enough to justify legal intervention
only when disclosure is made to "the public at large, or to so many per-
sons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become
A.2d 133, 136-38 (1974); Lemnah v. American Breeders Serv., 144 Vt. 568, 575-76, 482 A.2d 700,
704-05 (1984).
150. 753 F.2d 88 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1005 (1985).
151. 66 Md. App. 133, 502 A.2d 1101 (Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 306 Md. 289, 508 A.2d
488, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 984 (1986).
152. McSurely, 753 F.2d at 113.
153. Pemberton, 66 Md. App. at 166, 502 A.2d at 1118.
154. Id. at 156, 502 A.2d at 1106.
155. Id. at 164-65, 502 A.2d at 1116-17.
156. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 (1977).
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one of public knowledge."15 7 The fallacy of this reasoning, however, is
illustrated by the facts of Pemberton. It is often more important to a
plaintiff to keep information from a few specific people than from an
anonymous public.158 In addition, the logic of the common law ordi-
narily dictates that considerations of the extent of a plaintiff's injuries go
to the remedy aspect of a tort, to the amount of damages that a plaintiff
might be entitled to receive, rather than to the liability aspect of a tort, to
whether or not a plaintiff can even bring an action.
The most plausible justification for the publicity requirement is yet a
third hypothesis, implied by the Restatement's suggestion that the
requirement rests on a distinction in kind rather than of degree. The
"distinction," the Restatement tells us, "is one between private and pub-
lic communication." '159 The difference between these two forms of com-
munication may be illustrated by the following example. Suppose a
defendant, in the course of an address to a large audience, speaks truth-
fully about a plaintiff's adultery. The Restatement explicitly provides
that a "statement made in an address to a large audience ... is sufficient
to give publicity within the meaning of the term as it is used in this Sec-
tion."" f  Ordinarily, in other words, a statement made in such an
address would be viewed as communicating "to the public at large." But
suppose that the defendant is a minister, the audience is his church, and
the statement is made in the course of a proceeding to administer church
discipline to the plaintiff. Although the statement is made in an address
to a large audience, we are likely to view the statement as qualitatively
different from one made in the course of a lecture to a large audience of
strangers. If the lecture to strangers feels unambiguously like a "public"
communication, the church proceeding feels considerably less so.' 61
Thus the publicity requirement cannot coherently turn merely on the
number of persons in an audience; it must instead depend upon some
qualitative judgment about the context of the relevant communication.
What is the nature of that judgment? How can we distinguish, for
example, between addressing an audience that consists of a plaintiff's
157. Id. § 652D comment a.
158. As the Michigan Supreme Court said in Beaumont:
Communication of embarrassing facts about an individual to a public not concerned with
that individual and with whom the individual is not concerned obviously is not a "serious
interference" with plaintiff's right to privacy, although it might be "unnecessary" or
"unreasonable." An invasion of a plaintiff's right to privacy is important if it exposes
private facts to a public whose knowledge of those facts would be embarrassing to the
plaintiff.
Beaumont v. Brown, 401 Mich. 80, 104-05, 257 N.W.2d 522, 531 (1977).
159. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment a (1977).
160. Id.
161. See Buzzard, Scarlet Letter Lawsuits: Private Affairs and Public Judgments, 10 CAMPBELL
L. REV. 1, 41-42 (1987); cf Landis v. Campbell, 79 Mo. 433, 439-41 (1883); Shurtleff v. Stevens, 51
Vt. 501, 514-15 (1879).
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church and an audience that consists of the general public? One obvious
difference is that members of a plaintiff's church are united with the
plaintiff in an explicit and recognized commitment to communal norms
and forms of interaction. Members of the general public, however, need
not share any such connections with a plaintiff. Thus Alvin Gouldnbr
has observed that
[a] "public" emerges when there is an attenuation between culture, on
the one side, and patteris of social interaction, on the other. Traditional
"groups" are characterized by the association and mutual support of
both elements; by the fact that their members have patterned social inter-
actions with one another which, in turn, fosters among them common
understandings and shared interests, which, again in turn, facilitates their
mutual interaction, and so on. A "public" "refers to a number of people
exposed to the same social stimuli," and having something in common
even without being in persisting interaction with one another .. .. "Pub-
lics" are persons who need not be "co-present," in the "sight and hearing
of one another."
... To make matters "public" means to open them even to those who are
not known personally, to those who do not ordinarily come into one's
sight and hearing. On the paradigmatic level, to make things public is to
take them (or to allow them to go) beyond the family, where all is in the
sight and hearing of others, and which constructs a context for communi-
cation that may, in consequence, be cryptic, allusive, seemingly vague.1 62
Gouldner's observations suggest that the publicity requirement, as
defined by the Restatement, distinguishes communications which form
part of the "allusive," affective, and primary interactions of a traditional
group, like a church, from those which form part of the impersonal inter-
actions of strangers who comprise a public. The Restatement and most
courts require that only communications of the second kind comply with
the civility rules enforced by the public disclosure tort. This is consistent
with the common sense expectation that public interactions ought to be
more formal and restrained, whereas private interactions may be more
informal and spontaneous. 163 As Richard Sennett has observed, tradi-
162. A. GOULDNER, THE DIALECTIC OF IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY 95, 101 (1976)
(citations omitted); see also J. BENNETT & M. TUMIN, SOCIAL LIFE: STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION
140 (1948).
163. Harold Garfinkel once asked his students as an experiment to act at home as if they were in
public, as if they were "boarders," and thus "to conduct themselves in a circumspect and polite
fashion." H. GARFINKEL, STUDIES IN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY 47 (1967). The results dramatically
illustrate the perceived strangeness of acting according to civility rules within the privacy of the
family. In eighty percent of the cases,
family members were stupefied. They vigorously sought to make the strange actions
intelligible and to restore the situation to normal appearances. Reports were filled with
accounts of astonishment, bewilderment, shock, anxiety, embarrassment, and anger, and
with charges by various family members that the student was mean, inconsiderate, selfish,
nasty, or impolite. Family members demanded explanations: What's the matter? What's
1989]
HeinOnline -- 77 Cal. L. Rev. 991 1989
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
tionally the "line drawn between public and private was essentially one
on which the claims of civility--epitomized by cosmopolitan, public
behavior-were balanced against the claims of nature-epitomized by
the family." 1"
We can interpret the publicity requirement, then, as an attempt to
ensure that public communications comply with minimum standards of
civility, while liberating private communications from the threat of legal
enforcement of such restraints. The requirement thus safeguards the per-
sonal and expressive quality of interactions among individuals who are
not strangers. So interpreted, however, the publicity requirement in
effect sacrifices the right to extract social respect through the mainte-
nance of an information preserve to the "mutual dependency, affection,
and tact"'165 associated with traditional group interactions.
This interpretation of the publicity requirement leads to results that
are quite counter-intuitive from an individualist perspective. Precisely
because primary group interactions are emotional and personal, they are
also volatile and potentially very hurtful. We often care more about
what those within our "group" think of us than we do about our reputa-
tion among the strangers who comprise the general public. Yet the pub-
licity requirement, as defined by the Restatement, would impose
sanctions for the disclosure of a husband's marital infidelity to the gen-
eral public, but not for its disclosure to his wife, on the grounds that the
law should not enforce the formal requirements of an information pre-
serve between husbands and wives. The justification of such a require-
ment obviously cannot be the protection of individuals from mental
distress or suffering. Its purpose must instead be understood in specifi-
cally social terms, as the maintenance of spontaneous and expressive
forms of group interaction. The commitment to this purpose fundamen-
tally divides the Restatement approach from the Beaumont approach.
gotten into you? Did you get fired? Are you sick? What are you being so superior about?
Why are you mad? Are you out of your mind or are you just stupid? One student acutely
embarrassed his mother in front of her friends by asking if she minded if he had a snack
from the refrigerator. "Mind if you have a little snack? You've been eating little snacks
around here for years without asking me. What's gotten into you?"
Id. at 47-48 (1967).
If Garfinkel's experiment illustrates the inappropriateness of acting with civility within the
informal and private bounds of the family, David Karp's work demonstrates the converse, that even
in situations of extreme public anonymity, "anonymity itself constitutes a norm to be maintained,
and there are rules for preserving it, which, if broken, subject the transgressor to negative sanctions."
Karp, Hiding in Pornographic Bookstores: A Reconsideration of the Nature of Urban Anonymity, I
URB. LIFE & CULTURE 427, 446 (1973). Even anonymity, in other words, is "produced by actors"
whose conduct is made meaningful by civility rules. Id. (emphasis in original).
164. R. SENNETT, THE FALL OF PUBLIC MAN: ON THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF CAPITALISM
18 (1978). Thus Sennett observes: "[W]hile man made himself in public, he realized his nature in the
private realm." Id. at 18-19 (emphasis in original).
165. A. GOULDNER, supra note 162, at 102.
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The difficulty with the Restatement's delineation of a publicity
requirement, however, is that it attempts to achieve this purpose in a way
that obscures the pertinent underlying values. The Restatement defines
the publicity requirement not merely in terms of the qualitative distinc-
tion "between private and public communication," but also in terms of
the quantitative distinction between communications "to a single person
or even to a small group of persons," and communications "to so many
persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to
become one of public knowledge." ' 6 The Restatement appears to
assume, in other words, that communications to a single person or to a
small group of persons are necessarily part of the primary dynamics of
group life. But this assumption masks a host of ambiguities.
Consider, first, the possibility that a defendant has communicated
private facts to the members of a small group to which the plaintiff, but
not the defendant, belongs. In Pemberton, for example, the Bethlehem
Steel Corporation anonymously sent a detective's report of the plaintiff's
marital infidelity to the plaintiff's wife. The plaintiff and the addressee of
the communication were in a primary relationship to each other, but the
defendant, Bethlehem Steel, was a stranger to that relationship. In this
circumstance the publicity requirement might be defended on the
grounds that members of a primary group have, so to speak, yielded to
each other their claim to enforce their respective information preserves.
The law's rejection of the plaintiff's claim could thus be seen to stem
from its refusal to check the flow of information between spouses, a
refusal calculated to promote the vitality of the very group to which the
plaintiff and addressee both belong.
The publicity requirement must be defended on quite different
grounds, however, if the defendant and his audience are members of a
small and intimate group to which the plaintiff does not belong. If Mrs.
Vassiliades' surgeon were to show her "before" and "after" pictures to a
private dinner party, for example, the communication forms part of the
dynamics of a group from which Mrs. Vassiliades is excluded. While it
may make sense to view Mrs. Vassiliades as in some sense having
"waived" her claims to an information preserve with respect to those
groups in which she claims membership, it does not make sense to view
her as having waived those claims with respect to a group consisting of
her surgeon's dinner guests. In such circumstances the publicity require-
ment can be defended only on the grounds that it is more important to
foster spontaneous communication among members of a group, than to
enforce respect for the information preserves of non-members.
There is, however, yet a third possibility. It is conceivable that
166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment a (1977).
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neither the plaintiff, nor the defendant, nor the addressee of the defend-
ant's communication are members of a common group. This situation is
illustrated by the facts of Lemnah v. American Breeders Service, 167 in
which the plaintiff was a local distributor and salesperson for the defend-
ant, which produced and nationally marketed bovine semen. Plaintiff's
contract with the defendant was terminated for delinquency in the pay-
ment of monies owing. The plaintiff alleged that defendant's employee
had stated to a farmer, who was also plaintiff's customer, that the termi-
nation was in part due to the "heavy drinking problem" of the
plaintiff.'16
The three parties to this transaction-the plaintiff, the defendant,
and the farmer-were in effect strangers to each other, connected only
through the arm's-length transactions of the market. No two of them
were members of a common group. Assuming that the defendant's com-
munication was a highly offensive disclosure of a private fact, it is hard to
understand what possible justification the Vermont Supreme Court could
have had in using the publicity requirement to bar recovery. The use of
the publicity requirement cannot be justified on the grounds of protecting
some special relationship of conversation or good fellowship between the
defendant and the farmer, nor can it be explained on the grounds of pro-
moting the plaintiff's intimate relationship with the farmer. The com-
munication to the farmer was, quite simply, a "public" communication,
and the farmer can be expected to hold the plaintiff coldly and imperson-
ally accountable for his drinking problem.
This suggests that there are circumstances in which the Restate-
ment's rule does not correspond to the underlying sociological point of
the publicity requirement. There may, however, be an explanation for
this disparity. The accurate differentiation of public from private com-
munications would require courts to develop explicit and workable crite-
ria for distinguishing the exact kinds of intimacies or group dynamics
that would preclude enforcement of the public disclosure tort. Thus, for
example, we might characterize the communication to the farmer in
Lemnah as "public" if the farmer were only the plaintiff's customer, but
as "private" if he were the plaintiff's intimate friend. The recognition
and justification of these distinctions would be difficult enough in the
abstract; it would be virtually impossible in the context of the common
law system of case-by-case adjudication, with its intense pressure to artic-
ulate explicitly the reasons for distinguishing or following pertinent
cases. The drafters of the Restatement might with good reason have
concluded that such a task was beyond the capacity of courts, especially
given the subtlety and elusiveness of the sociological concepts at issue.
167. 144 Vt. 568, 482 A.2d 700 (1984).
168. Id. at 568, 482 A.2d at 700.
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Thus they might have settled for a clear and workable rule-of-thumb,
roughly associating private group communications with those to a single
person or to a small group of persons, with full knowledge that in partic-
ular cases the rule would fail to accomplish its underlying purpose.
On this account, then, the Restatement's publicity requirement is an
example of a social norm transformed by the practical necessities of the
legal system. Although this "re-institutionalization" (to use Bohannan's
phrase) of the norm obscures the social purposes of the legal rule and
consequently leaves its underlying values ambiguous, such obscurity is
occasionally the price for a workable system of legal doctrine. It is
appropriate to take that price into account in evaluating the controversy
between the Beaumont and Restatement approaches. The more funda-
mental question, however, is whether we believe it to be more important
to promote group life than to require respect for individual claims to
information preserves.
C. The Concept of "'Legitimate Public Concern": The Tension Between
Civility and Public Accountability
If the concept of the "public" plays a controversial and ambiguous
role in the Restatement's "publicity" requirement, it takes undisputed
center stage in the last element of the public disclosure tort. In order to
satisfy this element a plaintiff must demonstrate that a defendant's com-
munication "is not of legitimate concern to the public."' 6 9 This require-
ment, which is sometimes called the "privilege to report news," 70 or the
"privilege to publicize newsworthy matters,"' 71 is acknowledged by all
common law courts that have recognized the public disclosure tort. The
requirement is the single most important distinction between the intru-
sion and public disclosure branches of the invasion of privacy tort."'7 If
the former seeks to regulate all highly offensive violations of spatial terri-
tories, the latter permits information territories to be freely broken if the
information at issue is "newsworthy."
The reason for this difference is not obscure: It lies in the distinction
between a territory conceived as a physical space, and a territory con-
ceived as an array of information. Preservation of the former requires no
more than the regulation of discrete forms of physical conduct; preserva-
tion of the latter, however, implies no less than control over the diffusion
of information throughout an entire society. The common law long ago
came to recognize the importance of that diffusion for maintaining social
169. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
170. Kalven, supra note 42, at 336.
171. Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976).
172. See, eg., Fletcher v. Florida Publishing Co., 319 So. 2d 100, 111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975),
rev'd on other grounds, 340 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930 (1977).
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order and solidarity. In his 1826 Treatise on defamation law, for exam-
ple, Thomas Starkie noted the "difficulties" involved in the regulation of
information about persons, because its
subject matter is more subtle and refined, and does not admit of the
broad and plain limits and distinctions which may be established in
respect of forcible injuries; for instance, in the case of battery of the per-
son, the law can, without hesitation, pronounce, that any, the least degree
of violence shall be deemed illegal, and entitle the complainant to his
remedy; but, communications concerning reputation cannot be so pro-
hibited; every day's convenience requires, that men, and their affairs,
should be discussed, though frequently at the hazard of individual repu-
tation; and it conduces mainly to the ends of morality and good order, to
the safety and security of society, that considerable latitude should be
afforded to such communications. The dread of public censure and dis-
grace is not only the most effectual, and therefore the most important,
but in numberless instances the only security which society possesses for
the preservation of decency and the performance of the private duties of
life.173
From the perspective of individuals, respect for information pre-
serves is a matter of common decency. From a more general perspective,
however, decency would itself be undermined if individuals could hide
immoral acts within the secrecy of information preserves. Moreover, as
Starkie observes, legal protection of information territories would have
other social costs, including those associated with transactions based
upon imperfect information.1 74
Long before the Constitution was relevant to the regulation of the
invasion of privacy tort, 175 the common law was sensitive to just such
policy concerns regarding the diffusion of information. Warren and
Brandeis, for example, flatly asserted that "[t]he right to privacy does not
prohibit any publication of matter which is of public or general inter-
est."' 76 The first decision to recognize a right of privacy, Pavesich v. New
England Life Insurance Co., 177 stated with equal firmness that "[t]he
truth may be spoken, written, or printed about all matters of a public
nature, as well as matters of a private nature in which the public has a
legitimate interest." '78 From the beginning, therefore, the task of the
173. T. STARKIE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SLANDER, LIBEL, SCANDALUM MAGNATUM,
AND FALSE RUMOURS at xx-xxi (New York 1826).
174. See G. SIMMEL, supra note 66, at 323.
175. The first amendment did not become applicable to state law until 1925 in the case of
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). It was not until 1964 that the first amendment was
deemed to control state defamation law. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
The first decision of the United States Supreme Court to apply the first amendment to state privacy
law was Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
176. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 6, at 214.
177. 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
178. Id. at 204, 50 S.E. at 74.
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common law has been to balance the importance of maintaining individ-
ual information preserves against the public's general interest in
information.
In conceptualizing the claims of the public, courts have tended to
follow two distinct forms of inquiry. The first is directed toward the
social status of the plaintiff; the second toward the social significance of
the information at issue. 79 Both inquiries ultimately lead to the same
issue, which is the nature of the public and its right to demand
information.
The first inquiry is best illustrated by the example of public officials
or candidates for public office. The obvious political importance of the
dissemination of full information about such individuals has led courts to
view them as having only extremely attenuated claims to information
preserves. 80 Although the recent flap over the disclosure of Gary Hart's
extramarital affair indicates that this view is still somewhat controver-
sial,'81 it is profoundly unlikely that courts will intervene to decide what
information may or may not be disclosed about a public official or candi-
date.' 2 The underlying metaphor is that of the expropriation of private
property, for "public men, are, as it were, public property."' 83 The
claims of public officials to a "private" information preserve are simply
overridden by the more general demands of the public for political
accountability.
Courts have reached a similar conclusion with regard to so-called
"voluntary public figures." In the words of the Restatement:
One who voluntarily places himself in the public eye, by engaging in pub-
lic activities, or by assuming a prominent role in institutions or activities
having general economic, cultural, social or similar public interest, or by
submitting himself or his work for public judgment, cannot complain
when he is given publicity that he has sought, even though it may be
unfavorable to him .... [T]he legitimate interest of the public in [such
an] individual may extend beyond those matters which are themselves
made public, and to some reasonable extent may include information as
to matters that would otherwise be private. 184
179. This twofold inquiry has also formed the basis for contemporary first amendment
regulation of state defamation law. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775
(1986).
180. See, eg., Kapellas v. Kofman, I Cal. 3d 20, 36-38, 459 P.2d 912, 922-24, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360,
370-71 (1969); Stryker v. Republic Pictures Corp., 108 Cal. App. 2d 191, 194, 238 P.2d 670, 672 (Ct.
App. 1952).
181. See, e.g., Nelson, Soul-Searching Press Ethics, NIEMAN REP., Spring 1988, at 15.
182. See Levinson, Public Lives and the Limits of Privacy, 21 POL. SC. & POL. 263 (1988); cf
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 273-75 (1971).
183. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 263 n.18 (1952); see also Mayrant v. Richardson, 10
S.C.L. (1 Nott & McC.) 347, 350 (S.C. 1818).
184. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment e (1977); see also R. SACK, LIBEL,
SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 410-11 (1980).
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Although the reasoning of the Restatement is almost entirely in terms of
the voluntary public figure's waiver of any right to an information pre-
serve, this logic is ultimately incomplete. For in almost every case a pub-
lic figure will bring an action for the disclosure of information which he
has not voluntarily made public, and it would be patently fictional to
assert that in such circumstances he has "waived" his claim to the pro-
tection of this information. In such cases, therefore, the law's refusal to
protect the public figure's information preserve must be justified in terms
of a substantive analysis of the public's "legitimate interest" in the infor-
mation at issue.
The second line of inquiry that courts have used to interpret the
"legitimate public concern" requirement contains just such a substantive
analysis. This inquiry focuses not on the social status of the plaintiff, but
rather on the nature of the information at issue. As the Restatement
asserts, "Included within the scope of legitimate public concern are mat-
ters of the kind customarily regarded as 'news.' "185 Gouldner's discus-
sion of the concept of the "public" suggests what is at stake in the
common law's emphatic position that the public's interest in "news"
overrides individual claims to an information preserve. According to
Gouldner, "news is a public (and a public-generating) social phenome-
non." '186 In large and diverse modern societies, in which common per-
sonal and patterned social interactions are quite limited, news provides
precisely those "same social stimuli" that gather together the population
into a "public." '187 Thus the "[e]mergence of the mass media and of the
'public' are mutually constructive developments."' 88  To restrict the
news is therefore simultaneously to restrict the public.
The public, however, has certain overriding claims to resist such
restriction. One such claim, raised in the context of public officials, is
185. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment g (1977); see, e.g., Campbell v.
Seabury Press, 614 F.2d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 1980); Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1128-29 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976); Logan v. District of Columbia, 447 F. Supp. 1328, 1333
(D.D.C. 1978); Neff v. Time, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 858, 861 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Kapellas v. Kofman, I
Cal. 3d 20, 36, 459 P.2d 912, 922, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360, 370 (1969); Jacova v. Southern Radio &
Television Co., 83 So. 2d 34, 40 (Fla. 1955); Cape Publications, Inc. v. Bridges, 423 So. 2d 426, 427
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), petition denied, 431 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893
(1983); Bremmer v. Journal-Tribune Publishing Co., 247 Iowa 817, 827-28, 76 N.W.2d 762, 768
(1956); Fry v. Ionia Sentinel-Standard, 101 Mich. App. 725, 729-30, 300 N.W.2d 687, 690 (Ct. App.
1980); B. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY: THE PREVENTION AND DEFENSE OF LITIGATION 447
(1987 Supp.).
186. A. GOULDNER, supra note 162, at 106.
187. See Molotch & Lester, News as Purposive Behavior: On the Strategic Use of Routine Events,
Accidents, and Scandals, 39 AM. Soc. REV. 101 (1974).
188. A. GOULDNER, supra note 162, at 95-96. As de Tocqueville put it: "IThere is a necessary
connection between public associations and newspapers: newspapers make associations, and
associations make newspapers ...." 2 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 112 (P.
Bradley ed. 1945) (H. Reeve trans. 1st ed. 1840).
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political. Because American law views the public, in its role as the elec-
torate, as ultimately responsible for political decisions, the public is pre-
sumptively entitled to all information that is necessary for informed
governance. This theory is well canvassed in the first amendment litera-
ture,189 and it is responsible for the frequent reiteration by the Supreme
Court that "expression on public issues 'has always rested on the highest
rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.' ,190
But although the application of the theory of political governance to
the public disclosure tort is uncontroversial, it is far too narrow to
explain the broad scope of "legitimate public concern" that courts have
felt compelled to protect. An excellent illustration is the classic case of
Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 191 which involved William James Sidis, a
famous child prodigy who in 1910 at the age of eleven had lectured dis-
tinguished mathematicians on the subject of 'four-dimensional bodies.
His graduation from Harvard College at the age of sixteen attracted
"considerable public attention." '92 But Sidis unfortunately never lived
up to his promise. Soon after his graduation he slipped into a public
obscurity from which he was rudely retrieved in 1937 by a biographical
sketch in the "Where Are They Now?" section of The New Yorker. The
sketch was "merciless in its dissection of intimate details of its subject's
personal life, and this in company with elaborate accounts of Sidis' pas-
sion for privacy and the pitiable lengths to which he has gone in order to
avoid public scrutiny."' 193 The Second Circuit characterized the article
as "a ruthless exposure of a once public character, who has since sought
and has now been deprived of the seclusion of private life." '194 The court
nevertheless concluded that Sidis could not recover for invasion of pri-
vacy, because the "public interest in obtaining information" was "domi-
nant over the individual's desire for privacy. "195
The court's decision to favor the interests of the public over Sidis'
claim to an information preserve cannot be explained by a narrowly
political theory of the public. The information contained in the article
was not relevant to the governance of the nation. Nor, except in a purely
tautological sense, can the court's decision be explained on the grounds
that Sidis' present pathetic condition was "news," for by 1937 he had
189. See, eg., BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the Substance
and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978); Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an
Absolute, 1961 Sup. Cr. REv. 245.
190. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (quoting Carey v. Brown,
447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)).
191. 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940).
192. Id. at 807.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 807-08.
195. Id. at 809.
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faded completely from public view. On what grounds, then, could the
court conclude that the public was entitled to the information contained
in the article?
The court reasoned that Sidis "was once a public figure" who had
"excited both admiration and curiosity"; the article was "a matter of
public concern" because it contained "the answer to the question of
whether or not [Sidis] had fulfilled his early promise."' 196 In effect, then,
the court equated the notion of legitimate public concern with efforts to
answer reasonable questions about public matters. Thus the court's anal-
ysis ultimately rested on the assumption that the public has a right to
inquire into the significance of public persons and events.
This assumption has deep historical and sociological roots.
Gouldner notes, for example, that because relations outside the family
lack "affection, emotional dependency, tact, and ... direct power over
one another, there will be far fewer constraints in what may be ques-
tioned in public."' 97 Thus public actions "are open to a critique by
strangers who have fewer inhibitions about demanding justification and
reasonable grounds,"' and for this reason such action must "routinely
have to give an accounting of itself, either by providing information
about its conduct or justification for it."' 9 9 "The public," in short, "is a
sphere in which one is accountable," and being accountable "means that
one can be constrained to reveal what one has done and why one has done
it." 200
Gouldner's claim, of course, is not that public discussion is invaria-
bly characterized by a rational inquiry into accountability. Anyone
familiar with the "unfair, intemperate, scurrilous and irresponsible" 20 1
character of much of our public discourse, or with the susceptibility of
that discourse to manipulation by what Walter Lippmann called "public-
ity men, ' '201 would know otherwise. Indeed, the discovery of the many
irrational elements of our public discourse in the 1920s led to a serious
"crisis" of democratic theory. °3 Gouldner's point is rather that the very
attempt to assess the meaning of public phenomena implies "a cleared
and safe space" in which the value of competing assessments may be
"questioned, negated and contradicted."2" The public search for
196. Id.
197. A. GOULDNER, supra note 162, at 102.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 103.
200. Id. at 102 (emphasis in original); see also Freeman & Mensch, supra note 3, at 243.
201. Desert Sun Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, 97 Cal. App. 3d 49, 51, 158 Cal. Rptr. 519,
521 (Ct. App. 1979).
202. W. LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION 345 (1922).
203. E. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE
PROBLEM OF VALUE 95-114 (1973).
204. A. GOULDNER, supra note 162, at 98 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 96-97.
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accountability, in other words, creates a structure of communication
which is inherently "critical.
20 5
Gouldner's observations suggest that the public, as a collection of
strangers united by access to common stimuli, is a social formation that
has its own distinctive dynamic. An important aspect of this dynamic is
the constant need to evaluate the significance of those stimuli whose
"public" dissemination establishes the public's own continued existence.
This need generates a critical logic in which no given evaluation can be
rendered invulnerable to contradiction. The power of this logic is plainly
visible in the reasoning of the Sidis opinion. The case in effect creates "a
cleared and safe space" in which rival interpretations of the meaning of
public persons and events may compete. The Sidis court refuses to cir-
cumscribe that space by withholding the information necessary for any
given interpretation.
Thus Sidis ultimately rests on what might be termed a normative
theory of public accountability, on the notion that the public should be
entitled to inquire freely into the significance of public persons and
events, and that this entitlement is so powerful that it overrides individ-
ual claims to the maintenance of information preserves. The theory is
highly influential in modem case law, and it has led courts to interpret
the "legitimate public concern" requirement as protecting the disclosure
of all information having "a rational and at least arguably close relation-
ship" to public persons or events "to be explained."206
The theory of public accountability offers a justification for the
Restatement's rules regarding "voluntary public figures," for such per-
sons are by definition already public, and hence subject to the free com-
petition of rival interpretive assessments. Thus even if voluntary public
figures have not "waived" their right to foreclose inquiry into nonpublic
aspects of their lives, the public nevertheless has the right to scrutinize
those aspects if they are relevant to its evaluation of the significance of
public action." 7
The theory also accounts for the Restatement's treatment of what it
calls "involuntary public figures." These are individuals who, without
their consent or approval, have become involved in public events like
crimes, disasters, or accidents. The Restatement concludes that such
persons
205. Id. at 98 (emphasis in original).
206. Virgil v. Sports Illustrated, 424 F. Supp. 1286, 1289 n.2 (S.D. Cal. 1976); see, e.g., Gilbert
v. Medical Economics Co., 665 F.2d 305, 308-09 (10th Cir. 1981); Campbell v. Seabury Press, 614
F.2d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 1980); Dresbach v. Doubleday & Co., 518 F. Supp. 1285, 1290-91 (D.D.C.
1981); Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d 580, 590 (D.C. 1985); Romaine v.
Kallinger, 109 N.J. 282, 302, 537 A.2d 284, 294 (1988).
207. See, e.g., Bilney v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 43 Md. App. 560, 570-73, 406 A.2d 652,
659-60 (Ct. Spec. App. 1979).
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are regarded as properly subject to the public interest, and publishers are
permitted to satisfy the curiosity of the public .... As in the case of the
voluntary public figure, the authorized publicity is not limited to the
event that itself arouses the public interest, and to some reasonable extent
includes publicity given to facts about the individual that would other-
wise be purely private.208
Because concepts of "consent" and "waiver" are obviously inappropri-
ate, the Restatement cannot explain exactly why the information pre-
serves of involuntary public figures should be subject to "authorized
publicity." The theory of public accountability, however, would justify
the dissemination of information necessary to assess the significance of
the public events in which such persons have become embroiled. Public-
ity would be actionable only when it bears "no discernible relationship"
to the public events that require explanation.20 9
The theory of public accountability, with its requirement that the
legal system permit public events and persons to be critically assessed,
can collide with the aspiration to subject public communications to civil-
ity rules, an aspiration embodied in the "publicity" requirement. This
conflict can be seen by comparing Sidis with Briscoe. In Sidis a public
figure was deemed accountable to the demands of public inquiry despite
the passage of time and a successful quest for anonymity; in Briscoe the
passage of time and the successful achievement of anonymity were
deemed to signify that a public figure had "reverted to that 'lawful and
unexciting life' led by others," so that "he no longer need 'satisfy the
curiosity of the public.' "'20 In Sidis public accountability runs rough-
shod over civility; in Briscoe civility forecloses the potential evaluation of
a public person and event, and hence impedes the critical process of pub-
lic accountability.
The reconciliation of this tension is an essential problematic of the
public disclosure tort. Sidis itself allows for the possibility that the public
accountability of public figuies may be theoretically limited by the
requirements of civility, but it predicts that these limits will be so attenu-
ated as to be praptically nonexistent:
We express no comment on whether or not the newsworthiness of
208. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment f (1977); see, e.g., Campbell v.
Seabury Press, 614 F.2d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 1980); Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976); Logan v. District of Columbia, 447 F. Supp. 1328, 1333
(D.D.C. 1978); Jacova v. Southern Radio & Television Co., 83 So. 2d 34, 37, 40 (Fla. 1955); Waters
v. Fleetwood, 212 Ga. 161, 167, 91 S.E.2d 344, 348 (1956); Bremmer v. Journal-Tribune Publishing
Co., 247 Iowa 817, 827-28, 76 N.W.2d 762, 768 (1956); S. HOFSTADTER & G. HOROWrTz, supra
note 51, at 116.
209. Howard v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 283 N.W.2d 289, 302 (Iowa 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 904 (1980); see also R. SACK, supra note 184, at 411-12.
210. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 538, 483 P.2d 34, 40, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866,
872 (1971) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 comment c (1939)).
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the matter printed will always constitute a complete defense. Revelations
may be so intimate and so unwarranted in view of the victim's position as
to outrage the community's notions of decency. But when focused upon
public characters, truthful comments upon dress, speech, habits, and the
ordinary aspects of personality will usually not transgress this line.
Regrettably or not, the misfortunes and frailties of neighbors and "public
figures" are subjects of considerable interest and discussion to the rest of
the population. And when such are the mores of the community, it
would be unwise for a court to bar their expression in the newspapers,
books, and magazines of the day.211
The development of the law has in general supported Sidis' prediction.
Even the California Supreme Court has come to characterize Briscoe, its
own precedent, as "an exception to the more general rule that 'once a
man has become a public figure, or news, he remains a matter of legiti-
mate recall to the public mind to the end of his days.' "22 Thus the logic
of public accountability has proved virtually overpowering with respect
to the discussion of public persons or events. Any information with a
"discernible relationship" to such public matters will likely be deemed
"of legitimate concern to the public," and hence its dissemination to the
public will not be actionable.21 3
That leaves open, however, the question of when information about
nonpublic persons or events may also be protected as "of legitimate con-
cern to the public." This question is nicely illustrated by the case of
Meetze v. Associated Press,214 in which the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that a story reporting the birth of a healthy baby boy to a
married twelve-year-old mother was of legitimate public interest, despite
the mother's request that there be no "publicity." '215 The birth was not a
public event until the Associated Press made it so, and for this reason the
court's holding cannot be explained by any theory of public accountabil-
ity. The publication of the story cannot be justified on the grounds of the
public's need to understand public events or persons. Instead the court's
protection of the story must depend upon a different theory, one which
addresses the question of when events or persons may be made public in
the first instance.
211. Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711
(1940).
212. Forsher v. Bugliosi, 26 Cal. 3d 792, 811, 608 P.2d 716, 726, 163 Cal. Rptr. 628, 638 (1980)
(quoting Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 418 (1960)); see also Dresbach v. Doubleday &
Co., 518 F. Supp. 1285, 1289 (D.D.C. 1981); Romaine v. Kallinger, 109 N.J. 282, 303-04, 537 A.2d
284, 294-95 (1988); McCormack v. Oklahoma Publishing Co., 6 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1618, 1622
(Okla. 1980).
213. With regard to such matters, courts have registered their appreciation of the "force" in
"the simple contention that whatever is in the news media is by definition newsworthy, that the press
must in the nature of things be the final arbiter of newsworthiness." Kalven, supra note 42, at 336.
214. 230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606 (1956).
215. Id. at 334, 95 S.E.2d at 608.
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One such theory is that of political governance. Because we under-
stand the public, in its role as the electorate, to be the ultimate source of
political authority, it follows that information pertinent to informed gov-
ernance should be made public. As Walter Lippmann observed at the
dawn of the modern first amendment era, "[N]ews is the chief source of
the opinion by which government now proceeds. '21 6 But this theory,
although uncontroversial, is too narrow to account for a case like Meetze,
and the South Carolina Supreme Court made no attempt to use it.
Instead the court defended its interpretation of the "legitimate public
concern" requirement on the grounds that it "is rather unusual for a
twelve-year-old girl to give birth to a child. It is a biological occurrence
which would naturally excite public interest. 21 7
This notion of "naturally" exciting public interest is puzzling. The
precise issue posed by Meetze is whether a mother's information preserve
should be forced to yield to the curiosity of the public. That the public is
in fact curious may well be true, but it merely restates the problem. As
the court itself notes, "[T]he phrase 'public or general interest' in this
connection does not mean mere curiosity."2 8 But this brings us back
full circle, for we cannot distinguish between "natural" and "mere" curi-
osity without some criterion of when it is justifiable to drag nonpublic
matters into the light of public scrutiny.
The second Restatement, in a widely cited and influential commen-
tary,21 9 offers just such a criterion. It suggests that the question of
whether giving publicity to nonpublic matters is of legitimate public con-
cern should be decided by reference to "the customs and conventions of
the community":
[I]n the last analysis what is proper becomes a matter of the community
mores. The line is to be drawn when the publicity ceases to be the giving
of information to which the public is entitled, and becomes a morbid and
sensational prying into private lives for its own sake, with which a rea-
sonable member of the public, with decent standards, would say that he
had no concern. The limitations, in other words, are those of common
decency, having due regard to the freedom of the press and its reasonable
leeway to choose what it will tell the public, but also due regard to the
feelings of the individual and the harm that will be done to him by the
216. W. LIPPMANN, LIBERTY AND THE NEWS 12 (1920).
217. Meetze, 230 S.C. at 338, 95 S.E.2d at 610. The court expressed "regret" that it could not
"give legal recognition to Mrs. Meetze's desire to avoid publicity but the courts do not sit as censors
of the manners of the Press." Id. at 339, 95 S.E.2d at 610.
218. Id. at 337, 95 S.E.2d at 609 (quoting 41 AM. JUR. Privacy § 14 (1942)).
219. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Medical Economics Co., 665 F.2d 305, 307-08 (10th Cir. 1981); Wasser
v. San Diego Union, 191 Cal. App. 3d 1455, 1461-62, 236 Cal. Rptr. 772, 776 (Ct. App. 1987);
Bilney v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 43 Md. App. 560, 572-73, 406 A.2d 652, 659-60 (Ct. Spec.
App. 1979); Montesano v. Donrey Media Group, 99 Nev. 644, 651, 668 P.2d 1081, 1086 (1983), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 959 (1984).
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exposure.22 °
At first blush, the Restatement's interpretation would appear to explain
why, for example, the South Carolina Supreme Court, thirty years after
Meetze, would in Hawkins v. Multimedia, Inc. 221 uphold a finding of lia-
bility against a newspaper for publicly disclosing the identity of a teenage
father of an illegitimate child in a story about teenage pregnancies. It is
plausible to suggest that "community mores" would be more offended by
such a story than by a comparatively inoffensive article identifying the
married twelve-year-old mother of a baby son.22 2
Upon further reflection, however, the gloss placed upon the Restate-
ment by a decision like Hawkins is inadequate, for it essentially equates
the "customs and conventions of the community" that determine
whether nonpublic matters are of legitimate public concern with the
social norms that underlie the twin requirements of "offensiveness" and
"private facts." It thus collapses the "legitimate public concern" test
into the very criteria that define whether disclosures are actionable,
thereby rendering the test superfluous. As a result the capacity of the
news to make persons and events public would be completely
subordinated to the civility rules enforced by the public disclosure tort.
Most courts, however, have refused to subordinate the news in this
manner. In Kelley v. Post Publishing Co.,223 for example, a newspaper
was sued for publishing the photograph of a hideously deformed body of
a child after a fatal automobile accident. While the display of such a
photograph might well exceed the bounds of common decency, the court
in Kelley ruled that it was not actionable for the newspaper to publish the
photograph, on the grounds that any contrary conclusion would prevent
the publication of pictures "of a train wreck or of an airplane crash if any
of the bodies of the victims were recognizable.
22 4
Kelley's reasoning rests on two widely-shared and important prem-
ises. The first is that we want information about events like disasters to
be made public; the second is that we want this information disseminated
even if doing so would violate the civility rules that would otherwise be
220. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 652D comment h (1977).
221. 288 S.C. 569, 344 S.E.2d 145, cerL denied, 479 U.S. 1012 (1986).
222. Thus in Meetze the court had offered
another reason why the facts do not show a wrongful invasion of the right of privacy. It
would be going pretty far to say that the article complained of was reasonably calculated to
embarrass or humiliate the plaintiffs or cause mental distress. Although Mrs. Meetze was
only eleven years old when she married, the marriage was not void.
Meetze, 230 S.C. at 338, 95 S.E.2d at 610. At first this reason appears to pertain to whether the story
at issue is "highly offensive." But a case like Hawkins suggests that a lack of such offensiveness is
equally pertinent to the judgment that the public's curiosity in Mrs. Meetze's delivery is not
unjustified.
223. 327 Mass. 275, 98 N.E.2d 286 (1951).
224. Id. at 278, 98 N.E.2d at 287.
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enforced by the tort.2 2 5 It is clear that the Restatement shares these
premises, for it explicitly states that "[a]uthorized publicity includes pub-
lications concerning homicide and other crimes, arrests, police raids, sui-
cides, marriages and divorces, accidents, fires, catastrophes of nature...
and many other similar matters of genuine, even if more or less
deplorable, popular appeal. 22
6
Thus the Restatement, and in fact almost all courts, interpret the
"legitimate public concern" requirement as insulating from legal liability
news that is uncivil and "deplorable. ' 227 But this implies that the "com-
munity mores" which determine whether the disclosure of nonpublic
matters is of legitimate public concern cannot be the same as the civility
rules which determine whether communications are "highly offensive"
disclosures of "private" facts. The Restatement tells us that the commu-
nity mores at issue in the "legitimate public concern" test are instead
those which identify "matters ... customarily regarded as 'news.' "228
These mores circumscribe the scope of the press' "reasonable leeway to
choose what it will tell the public. 229
But while this interpretation of the "legitimate public concern"
requirement has the virtue of internal coherence, it simultaneously raises
a distinct and pressing issue of public policy: Why should the press be
confined by the customary definition of "news"? It is true that the mores
which define newsgathering define the boundaries of public life as we
now know it, but why should the law hinder attempts to enlarge that life,
particularly if there is a public desire for the information constitutive of
such enlargements?
The answer, of course, is that once persons or events are made pub-
lic, the logic of public accountability will all but displace rules of civility.
In the public sphere all persons and events are subject to an unblinking
scrutiny that searches for meaning and significance; in the sphere of com-
225. A good example of the expression of these premises may be found in the recent remarks of
the Dutch journalist Joop Swart, at an exhibition of the winners of the World Press Photo
Competition:
Some of the pictures you see here might shock you deeply. And some of you might be
inclined to denounce them as sensational, distasteful, intruding into the privacy of the
individual.
But let me remind you that the photographers who made those pictures chose reality
over escapism....
Let us be grateful to them, because they expanded our world.
Morris, In Press Photos, the World at Its Worst, Int'l Herald Tribune, May 12, 1989, at 9, col. 3.
226. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment g (1977).
227. See, e.g., Cape Publications, Inc. v. Bridges, 423 So. 2d 426, 427-28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982); Waters v. Fleetwood, 212 Ga. 161, 91 S.E.2d 344 (1956); Beresky v. Teschner, 64 IIl. App. 3d
848, 381 N.E.2d 979 (App. Ct. 1978); Bremmer v. Journal-Tribune Publishing Co., 247 Iowa 817,
827-28, 76 N.W.2d 762, 768 (1956); Costlow v. Cusimano, 34 A.D.2d 196, 311 N.Y.S.2d 92 (App.
Div. 1970).
228. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment g (1977).
229. Id. at comment h.
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munity such scrutiny is experienced as demeaning and as utterly destruc-
tive of the conventions that give meaning to human dignity. 3 The two
spheres are deeply incommensurate and can coexist only in an uneasy
tension. The common law therefore resists enlargement of the public
sphere because it is inconsistent with the maintenance of social personal-
ity. What is ultimately at stake in this resistance is thus the protection of
both individual dignity and community identity, as constituted by rules
of civility, from the encroachments of the logic of public accountability.
In the modem tort the reach of this logic is as a practical matter
determined by the application of the "legitimate public concern" test to
nonpublic matters. The test thus bears an enormous social pressure, and
it is not surprising to find that the common law is deeply confused and
ambivalent about its application.231 One jurisdiction abandons the field
to the public sphere and refuses to enforce communal norms of civil-
ity,2 32 while another gives full sway to "'the customs and conventions of
the community,' ,233 while yet a third holds that "in borderline cases the
benefit of doubt should be cast in favor of protecting the publication. '2 34
Some courts confine the sphere of legitimate public concern to informa-
tion that is, in Gouldner's phrase, "decontextualized, 2 35 so that they
"distinguish between fictionalization and dramatization on the one hand
and dissemination of news and information on the other.21 36  Other
courts hold that "it is neither feasible nor desirable for a court to make a
distinction between news for information and news for entertainment in
determining the extent to which publication is privileged. 237
In these various and inconsistent interpretations of the "legitimate
public concern" test one can trace the wavering line between the insistent
demands of public accountability and the expressive claims of communal
230. See E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS 23-32 (1961).
231. Compare Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's
Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 350-51 (1983) with Woito & McNulty, The Privacy
Disclosure Tort and the First Amendment: Should the Community Decide Newsworthiness 64 IowA
L. REV. 185 (1979).
232. Hall v. Post, 323 N.C. 259, 269-70, 372 S.E.2d 711, 717 (1988); Anderson v. Fisher
Broadcasting Co., 300 Or. 452, 469, 712 P.2d 803, 814 (1986).
233. Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976)
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment f (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975)).
234. Cordell v. Detective Publications, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1212, 1220 (E.D. Tenn. 1968), aff'd,
419 F.2d 989 (6th Cir. 1969).
235. A. GOULDNER, supra note 162, at 95 (emphasis in original).
236. Garner v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 546, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); see Hazlitt v.
Fawcett Publications, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 538, 545 (D. Conn. 1953); Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc.,
139 Cal. App. 3d 118, 134-35, 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 773 (Ct. App. 1983); Aquino v. Bulletin Co., 190
Pa. Super. 528, 536-41, 154 A.2d 422, 427-30 (Super. Ct. 1959). On the distinction between
newspapers getting "the facts" and getting "the story," see M. SCHUDSON, DISCOVERING THE
NEWs: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS 88-120 (1978).
237. Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 251 F.2d 447, 451 (3d Cir.) (footnote omitted), cert. denied,
357 U.S. 921 (1958); cf Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
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life. Common law courts, like the rest of us, are searching for ways to
mediate between these two necessary and yet conflicting regimes. We
can understand the public disclosure tort, then, as holding a flickering
candle to what Max Weber in 1918 called the "fate of our times," which
is of course the "rationalization and intellectualization and, above all,...
the 'disenchantment of the world.' "238
IV
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: THE FRAGILITY OF PRIVACY
I hope I have made good on my initial claim that the common law
tort of invasion of privacy reflects a complex and fascinating apprehen-
sion of the social texture of contemporary society. The tort safeguards
the interests of individuals in the maintenance of rules of civility. These
rules enable individuals to receive and to express respect, and to that
extent are constitutive of human dignity. In the case of intrusion, these
rules also enable individuals to receive and to express intimacy, and to
that extent are constitutive of human autonomy. In the case of both
intrusion and public disclosure, the civility rules maintained by the tort
embody the obligations owed by members of a community to each other,
and to that extent define the substance and boundaries of community life.
The tort's preservation of civility rules appears in its clearest and
least qualified form in the branch of the tort that protects the seclusion of
individuals from intrusion. But when civility rules attempt to control
communication, as in the branch of the tort that regulates the public
disclosure of private information, the common law must confront the
tension between such rules and the demands of public accountability.
The common law has been torn between maintaining the civility which
we expect in public discourse, and giving ample "latitude '2 39 to the
processes of critical evaluation that are also intrinsic to that discourse.
This interpretation of the tort carries with it several significant
implications for the understanding of privacy in contemporary society.
First, it suggests that in everyday life we do not experience privacy as a
"neutral" or "objective" fact, but rather as an inherently normative set of
social practices that constitute a way of life, our way of life. The privacy
protected by the common law has no special "function," like the protec-
tion of secrecy or the maintenance of role segregation, although it may,
to a greater or lesser extent, accomplish each of these purposes. In the
tort, "privacy" is simply a label that we use to identify one aspect of the
many forms of respect by which we maintain a community. It is less
238. M. WEBER, Science as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 129, 155
(H. Gerth & C. Mills eds. & trans. 1958).
239. Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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important that the purity of the label be maintained, than that the forms
of community life of which it is a part be preserved.
Second, privacy understood as subsisting in the ritual idiom of civil-
ity rules can exist only where social life has the density and intensity to
generate and sustain such rules. It is important to stress, however, that
social life does not always have these characteristics. Certain kinds of
"total institutions," for example, deliberately violate civility rules so as to
degrade and mortify inmates.z °
A less exotic and more significant example of the loss of civility rules
can be found in the writings of James Rule, who has extensively studied
large scale surveillance organizations like consumer credit rating agen-
cies. Rule found that attempts to limit the access of such organizations
to personal information in the name of privacy were invariably trans-
formed into requirements that such organizations ensure the accuracy
and instrumentally appropriate use of such information.2 41 This trans-
formation ultimately rested on the unimpeachable assumption that
organizations could reach better, more precise decisions with greater
information, and on the more questionable assumption that "both organ-
izations and individuals shared an interest in [this] enhanced effi-
ciency.""242 What Rule found striking was the absence of any strong
privacy claims that could limit the absolute amount of information
obtainable by such organizations.
This absence, however, is rendered explicable by Rule's own
account of the nature of the "privacy" interest at stake, which in his view
amounted to no more than "'aesthetic' satisfactions in keeping private
spheres private." '243 In the instrumental world of large surveillance
organizations, in other words, the realm of the private has dwindled to
the domain of the "instinctive." 2" This strongly suggests that relation-
ships between individuals and large organizations like credit rating agen-
cies are not sufficiently textured or dense to sustain vital rules of civility,
and that as a result privacy has lost its social and communal character.
But if the value of privacy can be conceptualized only in personal or
subjective terms, it should be no surprise that its value has not proved
politically powerful.
Third, the specific areas of social life that are governed by rules of
240. E. GOFFMAN, supra note 230, at 14-35.
241. J. RULE, D. MCADAM, L. STEARNS & D. UGLOW, THE POLITICS OF PRIVACY 70-71
(1980).
242. Id. at 70.
243. Id. at 71.
244. Id. at 22. In an earlier work, Rule characterized the value of privacy as the pre-social good
of "autonomy." J. RULE, PRIVATE LIVES AND PUBLIC SURVEILLANCE 349-58 (1973). He
expressed his hope that "values of individual autonomy and privacy can prevail in these contexts
over those of collective rationality." Id. at 354.
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civility are vulnerable to displacement by exogenous institutions. The
preemption of civility by the rational accountability characteristic of the
public sphere is only one example of such exogenous pressure. Another
would be the claims of the state to control and regulate communal life.
Stanley Diamond has eloquently documented how the modem state has
"cannibalized" the "spontaneous, traditional, personal, [and] commonly
known" aspects of "custom."24  This tension between the prerogatives
of state power and the norms of communal life is plainly visible in our
fourth amendment jurisprudence, which attempts to subordinate the con-
duct of state law enforcement officials to the community's normatively
sanctioned "expectations of privacy," while simultaneously balancing
against these expectations "the government's need for effective methods
to deal with breaches of public order."246 In this balance it is not uncom-
mon for the instrumental needs of the state to override community
norms.
The ultimate lesson of the tort, then, is the extreme fragility of pri-
vacy norms in modem life. That fragility stems not merely from our
ravenous appetite for the management of our social environment, but
also from the undeniable prerogatives of public accountability. In the
attempt to assess the meaning of public phenomena, the way of life that
happens to constitute us, and to bestow our privacy with its meaning,
appears to be merely arbitrary-a matter of aesthetics or instinct. And
we are thus led to attempt to rationalize the value of privacy, to discover
its functions and reasons, to dress it up in the philosophical language of
autonomy, or to dress it down in the economic language of information
costs. But this is to miss the plain fact that privacy is for us a living
reality only because we enjoy a certain kind of communal existence. Our
very "dignity" inheres in that existence,247 which, if it is not acknowl-
edged and preserved, will vanish, as will the privacy we cherish.
245. Diamond, The Rule of Law Versus the Order of Custom, 38 Soc. REs. 42, 44-47 (1971).
246. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985); see also United States v. Montoya de
Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402,
1414 (1989).
247. Rorty, Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism, 10 J. PHIL. 583, 586-87 (1983).
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